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MANAGING THE IMPOSSIBLE TRINITY: 
VOLATILE CAPITAL FLOWS AND INDIAN MONETARY POLICY 
 
Rakesh Mohan* and Muneesh Kapur† 
 
November 2009‡ 
 
Abstract 
 
Large capital inflows are often associated with subsequent credit and investment booms, inflation, 
overheating, real exchange rate misalignments, current account imbalances and financial sector weaknesses 
culminating in financial crisis, and long-lasting output losses. India too has received large and volatile capital 
flows since 1993-94, especially during 2004-09. Nonetheless, macroeconomic, price and financial stability has 
been maintained in an environment of high growth. What explains these desirable outcomes in India?  
An assessment of external sector and monetary management policies adopted by India since the early 
1990s, undertaken in this paper, suggests that the outcomes can be attributed to a judicious use of menu of 
options. These have included: active management of the capital account, especially debt flows; within debt 
flows, tighter prudential restrictions on access of financial intermediaries to external borrowings vis-a-vis non-
financial corporate entities; flexibility in exchange rate movements but with capacity to intervene in times of 
excessive volatility along with appropriate sterilisation of interventions;  associated building up of adequate 
reserves; continuous development of financial markets in terms of participants and instruments; strengthening 
of the financial sector through prudential regulation while also enhancing competition; pre-emptive tightening 
of prudential norms in case of sectors witnessing very high credit growth; and refinements in the institutional 
framework for monetary policy. 
 As a result of this approach, growth in monetary and credit aggregates could be contained consistent 
with the real economy undergoing growth, structural transformation and financial deepening. Inflation was 
contained even as growth accelerated. Overall, financial stability was maintained even as the global economic 
environment was characterised by a series of financial crises. The impossible trinity was managed by 
preferring middle solutions of open but managed capital account and flexible exchange rate but with 
management of volatility. Rather than relying on a single instrument, many instruments have been used in 
coordination. This was enabled by the fact that both monetary policy and regulation of banks and other 
financial institutions and key financial markets are under the jurisdiction of the Reserve Bank, which permitted 
smooth use of various policy instruments. Key lessons from the Indian experience are that monetary policy 
needs to move away from narrow price stability/inflation targeting objective. Given the volatility and the need 
to ensure broader stability of the financial system, central banks need multiple instruments. Capital account 
management has to be countercyclical, just as is the case monetary and fiscal policies. Judgements in capital 
account management are no more complex than those made in monetary management. 
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MANAGING THE IMPOSSIBLE TRINITY:  
VOLATILE CAPITAL FLOWS AND INDIAN MONETARY POLICY0F 
 
Rakesh Mohan1F1 and Muneesh Kapur 2F2  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The conduct of monetary policy in India has seen a significant 
transformation since the early 1990s. The period prior to that was 
characterised by fiscal dominance and associated financial repression. 
That, inter alia, necessitated administered interest rates, large statutory 
pre-emptions for financing the fiscal requirements, and sectoral credit 
targets. Since the early 1990s, the overall economic environment has 
changed substantially from that of a tightly controlled and regulated 
economy to one benefitting from a growing degree of deregulation and 
liberalisation, both domestic and external. Fiscal dominance has given 
way to monetary-fiscal coordination on the back of fiscal responsibility 
legislations and other complementary reforms. Statutory pre-emptions 
have seen significant reduction; interest rates have been deregulated, 
although still not fully; financial markets have seen progressive deepening, 
                                                            
 Paper prepared for the Tenth Annual Conference on Indian Economic Policy 
Reform organized by the Stanford Centre for International Development, 
Stanford University at Stanford, October 22-23, 2009. 
1  Distinguished Consulting Professor, Stanford Centre for International 
Development, Stanford University and former Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank of 
India 
2  Director, Special Studies Unit, Department of Economic Analysis and Policy, 
Reserve Bank of India. 
 Views expressed in the paper are personal and do not necessarily represent 
those of the Reserve Bank of India. 
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widening and integration over the years; the external sector has witnessed 
significant liberalisation – the current account became convertible in 1994 
and the exchange rate has been largely market-determined since March 
1993. The capital account has been progressively liberalised in terms of 
inflows as well as outflows. Monetary policy signals are now largely 
transmitted through changes in policy rates. Legislative amendments have 
been undertaken to provide RBI greater leeway in its monetary operations. 
The various reforms that have taken place since the early 1990s 
have thus provided greater flexibility to monetary policy in its conduct and 
operations. At the same time, monetary policy has had to grapple with 
new challenges beginning 1993-94 from large and growing, but volatile 
capital flows. These challenges have grown markedly since 2003-04 on 
the back of a large jump in net capital flows, which reached a peak of 
almost 9 per cent of GDP in 2007-08 – much above the current account 
deficit. In the very next year (2008-09), as a consequence of the global 
financial crisis, capital flows slumped to 0.8 per cent of GDP – and fell 
short of the current account deficit, which itself widened. During 2007, 
India was the highest recipient of net capital flows amongst all EMEs and 
the third highest globally (after US and Spain). 
Large capital inflows are often associated with subsequent credit 
and investment booms, inflation, overheating, real exchange rate 
misalignments, current account imbalances and financial sector 
weaknesses culminating in financial crisis. Reversals of capital flows to 
the EMEs are often quick, as again shown by the current financial crisis, 
necessitating a painful adjustment in bank credit, collapse of asset prices, 
compression of domestic demand and output losses. Thus, the boom and 
bust pattern of capital inflows can, unless managed proactively, result in 
large employment and output losses, and macroeconomic and financial 
instability. On account of such a boom and bust pattern, since the mid-
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1990s many EMEs and regions – Mexico in 1994-95, Asia in 1997, Russia 
in 1998, Argentina in 2001, and Emerging Europe in the ongoing financial 
crisis – have suffered financial crises. “Financial crises are more frequent 
than most people think, and they lead to losses that are much larger than 
one would hope. On average, there have been between three and four 
systemic banking crises per year for the past quarter century” (Cecchetti, 
Kohler and Upper, 2009). In a sample of 40 financial crises, these authors 
found that fully one fourth resulted in cumulative output losses of more 
than 25 per cent of pre-crisis GDP. And one third of the crisis-related 
contractions lasted for three years or more.  Whereas crises in the recent 
past have largely been associated with EMEs and developing countries, 
the current crisis is that of advanced countries.  In their case also, it is the 
expansion of global financial imbalances that has been among the major 
causes. 
Against the above backdrop of recurrent crises and large losses, it 
is noteworthy that, despite the large volume of capital inflows and 
outflows, macroeconomic and financial stability has been maintained in 
India and most other EMEs over the past decade or so. Thus, even as 
financial crises have been rampant across the globe, financial excesses 
have been successfully contained in India and other EMEs even in the 
face of large capital inflows and outflows.  
How has India managed capital flows of such an order and still 
ensured high growth and financial stability? While theory commonly 
suggests that the combination of an open capital account, a fixed 
exchange rate and an independent monetary policy – “impossible trinity” 
or “macroeconomic policy trilemma” - is not possible, most emerging 
market economies have managed their way out of this impossible trinity by 
moving away from the hard corners to middle solutions. India too has 
managed the impossible trinity over the past couple of decades and the 
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outcomes have been satisfactory. How has the policy trilemma been 
managed? These are the issues that are addressed in this paper. 
The Impossible Trinity 
It is an accepted tenet of open economy macroeconomics that the 
combination of an open capital account, a fixed exchange rate and an 
independent monetary policy – the “impossible trinity” - is not feasible. 
Countries can attain any two of these three objectives but not all the three 
simultaneously. Thus, with an open capital account and a fixed exchange 
rate, an independent monetary policy is not possible. On the other hand, 
the pursuit of an independent monetary policy will require a country to 
accept either a closed capital account or a flexible exchange rate, but not 
both. 
As countries have opened their external accounts, both current and 
capital accounts, and as the Bretton Woods system broke down, it has 
been generally accepted that the operation of an independent monetary 
policy necessitated the operation of fully open capital accounts and 
floating exchange rates.  This has been the general macroeconomic and 
monetary policy regime followed by advanced countries. 
The practice followed by emerging market economies (EMEs) and 
other developing countries has, however, been different in recent years.  
Whereas the theory appears to restrict the choice to the hard corners of 
policy, it does not seem to have dealt with the possibility of operating in 
the middle.  With the experience gained from the Latin American debt 
crisis of the 1980s and 1990s, and that of the Asian crisis in the late 
1990s, most Asian and Latin American EMEs have eschewed both closed 
capital accounts and fixed exchange rates, as has India.  However, in 
most cases, they have practised different degrees of management of the 
capital account, while keeping it relatively open; and have also practised 
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managed floats of the exchange rate implying considerable flexibility but 
not a free float or a fixed exchange rate.  This practice has enabled them 
to retain monetary independence and in that sense managed the 
“impossible trinity.”  The actual conduct of policy reflects recognition of the 
actual costs and benefits of a fully open versus managed capital accounts 
and of a completely floating exchange rate versus a managed but flexible 
exchange rate.  India’s macroeconomic, monetary and external account 
management has very clearly been of this genre. 
Why have EMEs followed this particular direction in policy? 
 
Capital Flow Volatility, Exchange Rate and Monetary Policy 
A key area of concern and vulnerability for EMEs is on account of 
volatility in capital flows. Surges in capital flows are often followed by 
sudden stops. This volatility is often the consequence of monetary policy 
stance and other developments in advanced economies, unrelated to 
those in EMEs. Low interest rates in advanced economies encourage 
outflows from these economies into EMEs in search of yields and vice 
versa. Thus, interest rate cycles can generate cycles in capital flows to the 
EMEs (CGFS, 2009). In the ongoing financial crisis, EMEs have suffered 
despite the existence of strong domestic fundamentals. This is reflected in 
large projected capital outflows from EMEs in 2009 in contrast to record 
high inflows just two years earlier. Net private capital flows are projected 
to swing from inflows of US $ 617 billion in 2007 to outflows of US $ 190 
billion in 2009 – a turnaround of 5.5 per cent of EMEs’ GDP (Table 1). 
Such a fast turnaround in capital flows, if not managed actively by policy 
authorities, has serious consequences for the domestic economy and 
overall financial stability. This has again brought home very starkly in the 
latest episode of sub-prime financial turmoil. 
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Table 1: Capital Flows (net) to Emerging and Developing Economies 
Item 1980s 1990-96 1997-02 2003-06 2007 2008 2009
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
 
Amount in US $ billion 
Current account balance -28 -83 4 364 633 714 262
Private capital flows, net 8 124 86 201 617 109 -190
Direct investment, net 12 61 161 208 359 459 313
Private portfolio flows, net 6 65 2 -25 39 -155 -235
Other private capital flows, net -9 -2 -77 19 219 -195 -268
Official flows, net n.a. -13 8   -90 -101 -60 58
Change in reserves -10 -58 -114 -550 -1258 -866 -266
 
Per cent to GDP 
Current account balance -0.7 -1.7 0.0 3.4 4.1 3.8 1.6
Private capital flows, net 0.2 2.5 1.4 2.1 4.0 0.6 -1.1
Direct investment, net 0.3 1.2 2.6 2.1 2.3 2.5 1.9
Private portfolio flows, net 0.1 1.3 0.1 -0.2 0.3 -0.8 -1.4
Other private capital flows, net -0.2 -0.1 -1.3 0.2 1.4 -1.0 -1.6
Official flows, net n.a. -0.2 0.1 -0.9 -0.7 -0.3 0.3
Change in reserves -0.3 -1.2 -1.8 -5.5 -8.2 -4.7 -1.6
Notes: 
1. Data in columns 2 to 5 are annual averages for the respective periods.  
2. Data for 2009 in column 8 are IMF projections.   
3. –ve sign in “change in reserves“ denotes increase in reserves. 
4. n.a.: not available. 
Source: World Economic Outlook Database (April 2009), IMF. 
 
 
 
While there has been a sharp expansion in the volume and volatility 
of net capital flows, there has been an even more significant growth in 
underlying gross inflows and outflows (CGFS, 2009). Private capital 
inflows (net) by non-residents to all EMEs, taken together, jumped from an 
annual average of US $ 200 billion during 1998-2000 to US $ 800 billion in 
2003-06 and further to US $ 2,100 billion in 2007, but slumped to US $ 
750 billion in 2008. Over the same periods, private capital outflows by 
residents from the EMEs amounted to US $ 100 billion, US $ 600 billion, 
US $ 1,500 billion and US $ 650 billion, respectively (World Economic 
Outlook, April 2009, IMF). Inflows and outflows thus collapsed by almost 
two-thirds during 2008. It is these inflows and outflows that have greater 
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impact on daily exchange rate movements and expectations relative to net 
flows. They are often more important from policymakers’ point of view. 
Gross inflows and outflows of capital are also relevant in the context of the 
recent global credit bubble. “To understand the phenomenon of the global 
credit bubble, however, gross capital flows are far more important than net 
capital flows. The gross capital flows do not necessarily correspond to the 
savings-investment balances at a national and regional level. In fact, it 
was euro area banks that strikingly expanded cross-border lending, while 
the euro area as a whole did not register a current account surplus” 
(Shirakawa, 2009). 
Large volatility in capital flows, as being witnessed currently, has 
implications for domestic monetary and liquidity conditions in the EMEs. 
Sudden and substantial exchange rate movements constitute an important 
channel through which capital flows can potentially have an adverse 
impact on the domestic economy. The impact of exchange rate changes 
on the real sector is significantly different for developing countries as 
compared with that for reserve currency countries.  For the former which 
specialise in technology intensive products, the degree of exchange rate 
pass through is low, enabling exporters and importers to ignore temporary 
shocks and set stable product prices despite large currency fluctuations.  
Moreover, mature and well developed financial markets in these countries 
help to absorb the risk associated with exchange rate fluctuations with 
negligible spillover on the real activity.  On the other hand, for the majority 
of developing countries and EMEs, which specialise in labour-intensive 
and low and intermediate technology products, profit margins in the 
intensely competitive markets for these products are very thin and 
vulnerable to pricing power by large retail chains. Consequently, exchange 
rate volatility has significant employment, output and distributional 
consequences (Mohan, 2004). These observations are supported by 
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empirical evidence contained in Aghion, Bacchetta, Ranciere and Rogoff 
(2009). The paper finds that, in countries with less developed financial 
sectors, exchange rate volatility has a significant negative impact on 
productivity growth; the effects are, however, small or insignificant in 
countries with developed financial systems.  
In view of adverse implications of exchange rate volatility on 
macroeconomic performance, how should central banks/ monetary policy 
react to exchange rates? The conventional view is that policy interest 
rates should respond primarily to inflation and real GDP and not to 
exchange rate movements. Such recommendations are based on models 
that “are globalised: they assume perfect capital mobility between 
countries, interdependence of foreign exchange markets, price links 
between different countries, as well as export and import flows and the 
current account” and in these models “an increase in the trade deficit will 
tend to lead to a depreciation of the currency” (Taylor, 2008). However, 
from the perspective of emerging market economies, such 
recommendations/models are perhaps not appropriate. In the current 
state-of-the-art macro models, there is no room “for such things as 
bubbles and banking-system collapse” (Krugman, 2009). 
In the models, as noted by Taylor (op cit.) trade deficits lead to 
currency depreciation. What is the actual global experience on this issue? 
It is interesting that, contrary to what might be expected, a simple analysis 
of current account balance and exchange rates for a sample of 36 
countries indicates that current account deficits are associated with both 
nominal and real appreciation (Annex 1). Thus, at least in the current 
decade, countries with large current account deficits have surprisingly 
experienced a tendency for their exchange rates to appreciate, which can 
have significant deleterious effects on their real economies. 
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With open capital accounts and rapid movement of capital flows it is 
these flows that dominate the effect of current account deficits and drive 
exchange rate dynamics. Corrections do take place, but these are with 
substantial lags and often end up in crisis. The conventional models, it is 
apparent, are focussed on implications of exchange rates on price 
stability. But, as the current global financial crisis has shown, price stability 
does not guarantee financial stability. Exchange rate dynamics in an open 
capital account run the risk of creating financial fragilities. Thus, there 
seems to be an important role for policy authorities, not necessarily 
through interest rates, to ensure that large real exchange rate 
misalignments do not persist for long periods. This involves active capital 
account management, intervention and sterilisation, along with continuous 
strengthening of financial sector.  
With the increase in cross border capital flows, the exchange rate 
appears to be influenced more by these flows rather than developments in 
the current account, which perhaps reflects economic fundamentals 
better.  Since capital flows are much more volatile than current account 
developments, subject to herd behaviour leading to excess flows and 
sudden stops, EMEs have had to resort to some degree of capital account 
management and associated forex interventions influencing movements in 
the exchange rate. 
The Indian experience with respect to overall macro management 
has been broadly similar to that of other EMEs in Asia and Latin America 
over the past decade. It has also eschewed corner solutions in exchange 
rate and capital account management while practicing an independent 
monetary policy. Against this backdrop, in the next section an analytical 
assessment is made of management of the external sector in India since 
the early 1990s, with particular focus on management of the capital 
account and exchange rate. Efficacy of capital controls is critically 
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assessed. How monetary management was conducted in the context of 
volatile capital flows is then presented in Section III. The monetary policy 
framework employed, the mode of liquidity management and the range of 
sterilisation instruments/operations used are discussed in this section. 
This also includes a discussion of the prudential measures used to 
supplement monetary policy so as to manage the impossible trinity and 
ensure financial stability. Section IV undertakes an assessment of the 
outcomes in terms of key monetary and macroeconomic variables – credit, 
money supply, financial sector health, inflation and growth. The outcomes 
in the Indian context are compared with those in other economies. Key 
lessons from the Indian experience are set out in the concluding section.  
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II. MANAGEMENT OF THE EXTERNAL ACCOUNT IN INDIA 
 
The Policy Framework 
External sector policy has witnessed very significant changes as 
part of the overall economic reforms practiced in India since the early 
1990s.  The economy has been opened substantially over this period from 
its relatively closed stance earlier. The hallmark of policy has, however, 
been that of gradualism. 
 The current account was gradually liberalised over the decade of 
the 1990s with the elimination of quantitative trade restrictions and gradual 
reduction of tariffs, which are now close to ASEAN levels. Current account 
convertibility obligations under Article VIII of the IMF were accepted in 
1994.   Capital account liberalisation has been more gradual.  It has been 
seen as a continuous process, rather than as a one-off event, contingent 
upon the progress in fiscal consolidation, and in financial sector and real 
sector reforms.  This policy stance has been adopted since the early 
1990s, when capital account liberalisation was being recommended 
strongly as a goal.  It was only subsequent to the Asian Financial Crisis 
that more caution has crept into the international approach to full capital 
account opening. 
 In its approach to opening of the capital account, India has clearly 
recognized a hierarchy in capital flows.  It has favoured equity flows over 
debt flows and foreign direct investment over portfolio investment.  The 
Indian capital market has been opened to institutional portfolio flows, but 
with some limits on shares of domestic companies that can be held by 
foreign portfolio investors, both individually and collectively 3F3.  Apart from 
                                                            
3 Total shareholding of each FII/sub-account shall not exceed 10 per cent of the 
total paid-up capital, while total holdings of all FIIs /sub-accounts put together 
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some limits on proportion of equity held by non residents in certain 
sensitive sectors, FDI is now almost fully open. 
 A more cautious approach has been followed with regard to debt 
flows.  Portfolio investment in both corporate and government debt are 
governed by overall quantitative limits; the access of the nonfinancial 
corporate sector to external debt has been liberalised gradually, but is 
subject to adherence to criteria related to purpose, interest rate spreads 
and magnitudes of borrowing.  These controls have been modified from 
time to time depending on the volume of capital flows.  The access of 
financial sector intermediaries has been subject to more prudential 
restrictions in recognition of the greater hazards associated with such 
external borrowing. 
 Capital outflows have also been liberalised progressively.  All 
inflows by non residents are freely repatriable.  Resident non-financial 
companies have been enabled to invest abroad relatively freely with few 
restrictions.  Individuals can also invest abroad but within specified 
quantitative limits.  Individuals are, however, not permitted to borrow 
abroad. 
It is often argued that deep financial markets help in channelling large 
and volatile capital flows efficiently. If capital flows reach levels as high as 
9 per cent of GDP, as they did in India in 2007-08, it is debatable that 
even a highly advanced financial system can intermediate such capital 
flows efficiently and in a stable manner. For such a large volume of capital 
flows to be fully absorbed, an equivalent current account deficit or large 
real appreciation or a combination thereof would be the immediate 
consequence. These outcomes would in turn be manifested in asset price 
                                                                                                                                                                  
shall not exceed 24 per cent of the paid-up capital. The limit of 24 per cent can 
be increased to the sectoral cap/statutory limit, as applicable to the Indian 
company concerned, by passing a resolution of its Board of Directors followed by 
a special resolution to that effect by its General Body. 
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and credit booms and financial imbalances. All these options are clearly 
unsustainable and can lead to future fragility as revealed by the 
developments in some Asian economies during the Asian financial crisis 
of 1997 and in East European nations and the Baltics in the current global 
financial crisis. However, in 2007-08 the Indian current account deficit did 
increase to (-)1.5 percent of GDP, the highest level since 1995-96, and the 
real exchange rate appreciated by 13.4 per cent between August 2006 
and October 2007. 
Accordingly, in India, a multi-pronged approach has been pursued to 
manage the volatility emanating from capital flows. These include: 
calibrating the policy regime in regard to the debt component of capital 
inflows/outflows, distinction between financial intermediaries and other 
resident entities, liberalisation of policies in regard to capital outflows, 
flexibility in exchange rate movements, and interventions to smoothen 
volatility. Forex market interventions are sterilised through modulations in 
cash reserve requirement, and open market operations (including through 
issuances of government securities under the market stabilisation scheme 
(MSS)). Repo/reverse operations under the daily liquidity adjustment 
facility (LAF) also help to modulate liquidity. Prudential tools have been 
judiciously used to supplement monetary measures to contain financial 
excesses. More generally, prudential financial sector regulation has 
supplemented capital account management to ensure resilience of the 
domestic economy.  
 
Management of Debt Flows 
Debt flows – foreign borrowings by corporate entities, foreign 
investment in domestic debt securities (both government and corporate) 
and banks’ access to foreign borrowings – are subject to prudential 
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controls through a system of overall ceilings on the amounts that can be 
borrowed, maturity prescriptions and ceilings on interest rate spreads. The 
underlying rationale for this approach reflects the fact both inflation and 
growth in India are higher than those prevailing in the advanced 
economies. Accordingly, nominal interest rates are also higher in India 
and these differentials could continue over the foreseeable future in view 
of robust growth prospects of the Indian economy. In theory, in terms of 
uncovered interest parity (UIP), interest rate differentials should be offset 
by currency movements. However, the empirical evidence in favour of UIP 
is weak. Hence, an open policy regime in regard to debt flows can attract 
large hot money on account of not only interest rate differentials but also 
exchange rate expectations which then become self fulfilling for a period 
of time, attracting further arbitrage flows, before an ultimate reversal. It is, 
therefore, appropriate to have prudential policies on debt flows to avoid 
such instability in both the exchange rate and in capital flows. In order to 
aid the management of debt flows as part of overall capital flow 
management, the extant prudential policies at any given time are 
modulated depending on the circumstances. They are tightened during 
times of large capital inflows and liberalised when reversal takes place as 
happened in 2008-09. 
In particular, foreign investment in government securities is subject to 
overall ceilings (US $ 5.0 billion at present) (Table 2). Fiscal deficits in 
India remain high and these have increased further due to fiscal stimuli 
measures necessitated by the global financial crisis. Historically, fiscal 
deficits in India have been financed almost wholly through domestic 
sources (except for a small part through official aid). This domestic 
financing has minimised India’s vulnerabilities to crises, which have been 
very frequent elsewhere. Indeed, in the current global financial crisis, the 
absence of any sovereign issue in the international markets for financing 
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the deficit of the Government helped in limiting the effects of adverse 
external shocks on the macroeconomic policy environment of the country. 
Reflecting proactive management of liquidity by the Reserve Bank, 
domestic financial markets were able to absorb even the trebling in market 
borrowings during 2008-09.  As in the case of government securities, 
investment by non-residents in local corporate bonds is subject to overall 
ceilings (at present US $ 15 billion) (Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Ceilings on Investments by Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs) in Debt 
Instruments 
(US $ billion)  
UGovernment Securities UCorporate Debt Securities 
Date Ceiling Date Ceiling 
1 2 3 4 
April 1998 1.0 December 2, 2004 0.5 
November 2, 2004 1.75 April 5, 2006 1.5 
April 5, 2006 2.0 June 6, 2008 3.0 
January 19, 2007 2.6 October 16, 2008 6.0 
January 31, 2008 3.2 January 2, 2009 15.0 
June 6, 2008 5.0   
    
    
External Commercial Borrowing by Non-financial Corporate Entities 
The policy on external commercial borrowing by non-financial 
corporate entities is informed by the need to encourage private investment 
for growth. Providing creditworthy entities access to international capital 
markets helps in providing competition to domestic financial institutions 
apart from enhancing their own access to resources for investment 
purposes  Thus external commercial borrowings (ECBs) are permitted for 
investment (such as import of capital goods, new projects, 
19 
 
modernization/expansion of existing production units) in the real sector 
(industrial sector including small and medium enterprises, infrastructure 
sector and specific service sectors) as well as for overseas direct 
investment. On prudential grounds, ECB is, however, not permitted for (a) 
on-lending or investment in the capital market or for acquiring a company 
in India (b) investment in the real estate sector and (c) working capital, 
general corporate purpose and repayment of existing Rupee loans. 
Subject to these general guidelines, borrowings up to specified limits and 
maturity requirements do not need any prior permission. The “automatic” 
route was operationalised in 2000 for ECB up to US $ 50 million with 
minimum average maturity of three years, and then, on the basis of 
experience gained, liberalised  substantially subsequently, to US $ 500 
million (per borrowing company per financial year) in January 2004 for 
ECBs with minimum average maturity of five years. In addition, US $ 250 
million was permitted, effective December 2006, for borrowings with 
minimum average maturity of ten years. ECBs beyond these limits are 
subject to prior approval. Discretionary approvals for other purposes and 
beyond these individual ceilings are guided by the extant macro limits on 
total ECB that are prescribed for each financial year. 
In view of the large jump in capital flows during 2006-07 and 2007-08, 
the policy regime was tightened in 2007 in phases. First, in May 2007, the 
‘all-in-cost’ ceilings were tightened by 50-100 basis points (Table 3). 
Second, in August 2007 all ECBs above US $ 20 million were permitted 
only for foreign currency expenditure purposes (thus, use of ECBs for 
rupee expenditures was restricted). Unused proceeds were required to be 
parked overseas and could not be remitted to India.  Finally, taking in to 
account the sharp growth in asset prices, especially property prices, the 
use of ECBs for development of integrated townships was also prohibited 
(in addition to the existing ban on use for real estate).  
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Table 3: Management of External Commercial Borrowings 
(All-in-cost ceilings over 6-months LIBOR in basis points)
Date Minimum Average Maturity 
More than 3 years 
and up to 5 years 
More than 5 years 
and up to 7 years
More than 7 
years
1 2 3 4
January 31, 2004 200 350 350
May 21, 2007 150 250 250
May 29, 2008 200 350 350
September 22, 2008 200 350 450
October 22, 2008 300 500 500
January 2, 2009 * * *
Note: 
All-in-cost ceilings include rate of interest, other fees and expenses in foreign 
currency (except commitment fee, pre-payment fee, and fees payable in Indian 
Rupees). Payment of withholding tax in Indian Rupees is also excluded for 
calculating the all-in-cost. 
*: In view of the tightness in international financial markets on the back of the 
global financial crisis, the extant all-in-cost ceilings were dispensed with up to 
December 31, 2009. Borrowers proposing to avail of ECBs beyond these ceilings 
are required to approach RBI for approval. 
Source: Reserve Bank of India. 
 
Following the onset of the sub-prime led global financial crisis and 
the subsequent tightness in international financial markets, these 
restrictions were relaxed in a phased manner beginning May 2008 4F4. 
Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, restrictions on use of ECBs for 
rupee expenditures were withdrawn fully in October 2008. Thus, the policy 
                                                            
4 In May 2008, borrowers in infrastructure sector were permitted to avail ECBs up to USD 
100 million for rupee expenditure for permissible end-uses under the Approval Route; for 
other borrowers, the limit for rupee expenditure under the Approval Route was enhanced 
to USD 50 million. In September 2008, the limit of USD 100 million for infrastructure 
borrowers was raised to USD 500 million per financial year under the Approval Route. 
ECBs in excess of USD 100 million for Rupee expenditure were required to have a 
minimum average maturity period of 7 years. 
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framework on ECBs has been actively managed taking into account the 
relevant factors. Were these measures effective? 
Gross drawals under ECBs rose from a quarterly average of US $ 1.2 
billion during June 2002-September 2004 to US $ 4.1 billion during 
September 2005-December 2006 and further to US $ 7.2 billion during 
March 2007-September 2007. The large increase in ECBs could be 
attributed to the acceleration in manufacturing GDP growth from 7.0 per 
cent to 10.0 per cent and 10.2 per cent over the same periods (Chart 1). 
Monetary tightening by RBI over the same period in response to demand 
pressures and incipient signs of overheating also could have made ECBs 
attractive.  
Chart 1 
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Empirical evidence indicates that the policy framework was effective in 
achieving a balanced maturity profile as also in channelling funds for 
investment purposes such as import of capital goods. Reflecting the 
restrictions on use of ECBs for rupee expenditure, the proportion of 
borrowings used for import of capital goods increased from around 25 per 
cent during 2005-06 and 2006-07 to 41 per cent during 2007-08 (Table 4). 
The share of rupee expenditure fell from around 14 per cent to 3 per cent 
over the same period. Econometric estimates indicate that long-run 
demand for overseas commercial borrowings is influenced by the pace of 
domestic real activity, interest rate differentials between the domestic and 
international markets and domestic credit conditions. However, real 
variables dominate price variables in driving the demand for overseas 
commercial borrowings (Singh, 2007). 
 
Table 4: Utilisation Pattern of External Commercial Borrowings 
Item 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08
1 2 3 4
1. Total ECB Registrations (US $ billion) 11.5 25.4 31.0
2. Share in total (Per cent)  
   (a) Import of capital goods 26.7 22.7 41.1
   (b) Rupee expenditure for local sourcing of capital goods 16.5 12.1 2.7
   (c) New Projects, and  Modernisation/Expansion of 
Existing Units 
37.7 48.1 25.0
  (d) Investment in Joint Ventures Abroad and Wholly 
Owned Subsidiaries 
2.3 5.5 12.6
  (e) Others 16.8 11.6 18.6
Source: Singh (2007). 
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External Borrowing by Financial Intermediaries and Banks 
An important feature of the ECB policy is the distinction between 
borrowings by non-financial corporate entities and financial intermediaries, 
which has been in place since January 2004. Excessive foreign currency 
borrowings by financial intermediaries can expose them to the risks of 
both currency and maturity mismatches and can also be associated with 
unsustainable credit booms. More often, such excesses are followed by 
busts and severe crisis. Accordingly, access of financial intermediaries 
(banks, financial institutions, NBFCs, housing finance companies) to ECB, 
unlike other corporates, is subject to prior approval and for a few specified 
sectors/purposes. More generally, access of financial intermediaries to 
ECB is subsumed in a ceiling on their overall external borrowings. At 
present, banks’ overseas foreign currency borrowings (including ECB and 
loans/overdrafts from their head offices, overseas branches and 
correspondents) are restricted to 50 per cent of their unimpaired Tier-I 
Capital or US$ 10 million, whichever is higher 5F5.  
The prudent approach in regard to banks’ access to ECB is an 
important component of India’s overall approach to banking regulation and 
capital account management. As a part of financial sector reforms that 
were initiated in the early 1990s, the prudential framework governing 
banks, especially commercial banks, was tightened in a phased manner. 
A Board for Financial Supervision for focussed regulation and supervision 
of banks and other financial institutions was set up under RBI’s 
jurisdiction. Risk-weights, provisioning norms, income recognition norms 
and capital adequacy requirements were brought on par with international 
norms. As of April 2009, all commercial banks are Basel II compliant. 
                                                            
5  Overseas borrowings for export credit in foreign currency, subordinated debt 
placed by head offices of foreign banks with their branches as Tier II capital and 
capital funds raised by issue of ‘innovative perpetual debt instruments’ and ‘debt 
capital instruments’ are outside the 50 per cent limit. 
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While the banking system is dominated by public sector banks, 
competition has been ensured through new generation private sector 
banks as well as among public sector banks themselves. With the setting 
up of private banks, governance norms were strengthened and ‘fit and 
proper’ criterion for directors and senior management were also 
prescribed. Single- and group-exposure norms are in place to reduce 
concentration risks. A number of measures based on the principles that 
are now accepted internationally were already brought into practice even 
before the crisis. These included restrictions on leverage for banking and 
non banking institutions, stringent liquidity requirements, counter cyclical 
prudential measures, not recognising in Tier I capital many items that are 
now sought to be deducted internationally, recognising profits from sale of 
securitised assets to SPVs over the life of the securities issued, and not 
reckoning unrealised gains in earnings or in Tier I capital (Thorat, 2009). 
 
Non-Resident Deposits 
A specific feature of Indian banks’ external liabilities is the facility 
provided for deposits by non-resident Indians. This facility is a legacy of 
the earlier period that was characterised by shortage of foreign exchange 
resources. At that time, the facility provided for low risk bank deposits at 
interest rates higher than those available to retail depositors in their host 
countries. This route was then seen to be easier and cheaper for raising 
external resources rather than other forms of market borrowing in 
international capital markets. Incremental deposits are now small relative 
to ECB but do provide further flexibility in management of the capital 
account. Whereas these deposits are outside the 50 per cent ceiling noted 
above for banks, they are subject to prudential interest rate ceiling 
spreads over LIBOR/swap rates of respective currencies and maturities. 
Spreads over LIBOR have ranged between 0 and 250 basis points in the 
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case of rupee-denominated deposits (NRERA), where the foreign 
exchange risk is borne by the depositor. In the case of foreign currency 
denominated deposits (FCNRB), there is no foreign exchange risk for the 
depositor and the spread is lower than the rupee deposits; for most part of 
the current decade, the spread was negative. In order to attract stable 
deposits and de-emphasise short-term component, minimum maturity of 
deposits is one year. To manage these debt flows, interest rate ceilings 
are tightened during episodes of large capital inflows and vice versa 
(Table 5). 
 
Table 5: Management of Non-Resident Deposits: Interest Rate Ceilings 
(Spread above LIBOR/swap in basis points)
Non-Resident External Rupee 
Accounts (NRERA) 
 Foreign Currency Non-Resident 
Bank (FCNRB) Deposits 
Effective Date Spread  Effective Date Spread
1 2  3 4
July 17, 2003  250  April 19, 2001 0
September 15, 2003  100  April 29, 2002 (-)25
October 18, 2003 25  March 28, 2006 0
April 17, 2004 0  January 31, 2007 (-)25
November 1, 2004 50  April 24, 2007 (-)75
November 17, 2005 75  September 16, 2008 (-)25
April 18, 2006 100  October 15, 2008 25
January 31, 2007 50  November 15, 2008 100
April 24, 2007 0    
September 16, 2008 50    
October 15, 2008 100    
November 15, 2008 175    
 
Available empirical evidence suggests that non-resident deposits are 
influenced by standard risk and return variables, particularly changes in 
relative interest rates (Gordon and Gupta, 2004). These results are 
corroborated by the behaviour of non-resident deposits in the current 
decade. Both NRERA and FCNRB deposit inflows respond, as expected, 
to changes in deposit ceilings. Higher ceilings are followed by higher 
inflows and vice versa (Charts 2 and 3). Formal econometric analysis 
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supports the above observations. (Annex 2). A reduction of 100 basis 
points in interest rate ceilings on each of the deposits schemes is 
associated with a decline of over US $ 400 million in the long-run in both 
the schemes taken together (around US $ 5 billion per annum) and vice 
versa. Therefore, the policy modulations in interest rate ceilings appear to 
have been successful in their objective of having a better control over the 
volume of inflows under the deposits schemes.  
Charts 2 and 3 
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Overall, each component of debt flows is subject to policy modulation 
in response to changing conditions in both domestic and international 
capital markets. Experience suggests that the outcomes have largely been 
responsive to the policy measures used, even though a great deal of 
judgement has had to be used in making policy changes in a 
characteristically uncertain environment. 
 
Exchange Rate Management and Foreign Exchange Reserves 
India’s exchange rate policy in recent years has been guided by the 
broad principles of careful monitoring and management of exchange rates 
with flexibility, without a fixed target or a pre-announced target or a band, 
coupled with the ability to intervene if and when necessary, while allowing 
the underlying demand and supply conditions to determine the exchange 
rate movements over a period in an orderly way. Subject to this 
predominant objective, the exchange rate policy is guided by the need to 
reduce excess volatility, prevent the emergence of destabilising 
speculative activities, help maintain an adequate level of reserves, and 
develop an orderly foreign exchange market. Indeed, across all financial 
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markets, the key objective underlying the operating framework of 
monetary policy in India is to ensure stable conditions in financial markets 
by moderating volatility through a flexible use of policy instruments but 
without a specific view on the level of financial prices. Excessive volatility 
in the exchange rate has significantly more adverse impact on exports in 
low-income countries.   
In the context of exchange rate management in the presence of large 
and volatile capital flows, some India specific features need to be 
recognised. First, unlike other major EMEs, India has generally recorded 
current account deficits. Second, while the current account deficits have 
been manageable, merchandise trade deficits are rather high and these 
have increased rapidly in the past few years. The merchandise trade 
deficit/GDP ratio generally hovered between 2 and 3 per cent during 1990-
2004 (average of 2.7 per cent over this period). Over the following five 
years (2004-09), the merchandise trade deficit/GDP ratio more than 
doubled to an average of 7.2 per cent, reaching 10.4 per cent in 2008-09 
(Table 6). While remittances and software exports have somewhat offset 
the surging trade deficit, high levels of trade deficits cannot be ignored. In 
contrast, most of Asian EMEs have recorded persistent surpluses on their 
trade accounts. Some countries such as Hong Kong and Philippines do 
have trade deficits comparable to India, but their current accounts are still 
in surplus. Third, net capital inflows have been higher than current account 
deficits. While FDI inflows have increased substantially in the past 3-4 
years, portfolio investments by FIIs constitute a large part of capital flows 
and such flows are relatively volatile. Fourth, while the Indian inflation rate 
has seen a significant reduction from its levels during the 1970s and 
1980s, it is still higher than that in advanced economies and in some 
EMEs. Overall, there are different forces at play. While the trade deficit, 
current account deficit and higher inflation differentials would suggest 
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downward pressures on the exchange rate, capital flows exert upward 
pressures.  
 
Table 6: Merchandise Trade and Current Account Balance 
(Per cent to GDP)
Country 
1995-99 
(Average) 
2000-04 
(Average) 2005 2006 2007 2008
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
       
Merchandise Trade Balance 
China 3.5 2.9 6.0 8.2 9.3 8.3
Hong Kong -5.5 -4.4 -4.3 -7.4 -9.5 -10.7
Korea 2.9 3.4 3.9 2.9 2.7 0.6
Taiwan 4.8 6.7 5.5 6.6 7.9 4.6
India -3.6 -2.9 -6.4 -6.8 -7.8 -10.4
Indonesia 8.9 11.9 6.1 8.1 7.6 4.6
Malaysia 12.1 21.2 24.7 23.4 20.0 23.0
Philippines -9.4 -7.5 -7.9 -5.7 -5.8 -7.5
Singapore 12.7 23.2 30.1 30.7 28.2 16.9
Thailand -0.4 2.5 -4.7 0.5 4.7 0.1
Viet Nam -5.5 -2.4 -4.6 -4.6 -14.6 -14.1
       
Current Account Balance 
China 2.0 2.4 7.2 9.4 11.0 9.8
Hong Kong 1.1 7.5 11.4 12.1 12.3 14.2
Korea 2.0 2.1 1.8 0.6 0.6 -0.7
Taiwan 2.4 6.8 4.9 7.2 8.6 6.4
India -1.2 0.6 -1.2 -1.1 -1.5 -2.6
Indonesia -0.1 3.4 0.1 3.0 2.4 0.1
Malaysia 1.8 9.8 15.0 16.3 15.7 17.6
Philippines -3.2 -0.7 2.0 4.5 4.9 2.5
Singapore 17.4 15.6 22.7 25.4 23.5 14.8
Thailand 1.0 4.2 -4.3 1.1 5.7 -0.1
Viet Nam -4.5 -0.6 -1.1 -0.3 -9.8 -11.8
Source: Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2009, Asian Development Bank; 
Reserve Bank of India. 
Note: Data for India are on financial year basis. 
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The nature of capital flows, exchange rate management and foreign 
exchange reserves management are closely intertwined. If capital flows 
are perceived to be permanent, the exchange rate, in principle, should 
then bear the entire adjustment burden. However, if capital flows are 
volatile and are perceived to be temporary and reversible, then there is a 
case for smoothing the exchange rate adjustment. Capital flows reflect 
both push and pull factors. Whereas pull factors are clearly in the hands of 
domestic policy authorities and they can be seen as stable, push factors - 
monetary policy stance and other factors in the advanced economies – 
impart uncertainty to the volume of capital inflows. Ex-ante, it is, difficult to 
know as to whether capital flows are temporary or permanent. For 
example, the wave of copious capital inflows that started in 2003, along 
with the emergence of large global imbalances, was viewed by most 
observers, until the emergence of the sub-prime led crisis, as permanent. 
Events over the past two years have clearly shown that capital flows are 
highly volatile and they can change course very quickly. On balance, it 
would be prudent to presume capital flows as volatile and subject to 
sudden shocks and absorb them into foreign exchange reserves. 
Exchange rate management in India is, therefore, guided by the 
various considerations noted above, namely, avoidance of excessive 
volatility, high trade deficits, volatile capital flows, and build-up of adequate 
foreign exchange reserves. At the same time, movements in the day-to-
day exchange rate largely reflect market forces of demand and supply and 
there has been a growing degree of two-way movement in the exchange 
rate (Table 7). During the 1990s, though there were some large discrete 
changes in the exchange rate, it was otherwise relatively stable for the 
rest of the time. In contrast, in the past few years, there has been a higher 
degree of two-way movements in the exchange rate on day-to-day basis.  
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 Table 7: Exchange Rate of the Indian Rupee vis-à-vis the US dollar 
Year Coefficient 
of variation 
(daily data) 
(per cent) 
Daily 
absolute 
change in the 
exchange rate 
(annual 
average) 
(Rupees per 
dollar)
Number of days during the year 
with daily absolute change of more 
than
10 
paisa
20 
paisa 
30 paisa
1 2 3 4 5 6
1993-94 0.10 0.01 1 0 0
1994-95 0.29 0.01 3 2 1
1995-96 5.75 0.10 57 34 23
1996-97 1.35 0.04 21 10 2
1997-98 4.21 0.07 45 20 10
1998-99 2.12 0.05 37 14 6
1999-2000 0.68 0.03 8 1 0
2000-01 2.35 0.04 27 8 1
2001-02 1.47 0.04 19 2 1
2002-03 0.94 0.03 2 0 0
2003-04 1.56 0.05 24 5 3
2004-05 2.30 0.10 89 32 13
2005-06 1.79 0.07 62 13 5
2006-07 1.98 0.09 88 26 7
2007-08 2.07 0.11 102 42 20
2008-09 7.79 0.25 159 114 84
Note: Columns 4, 5 and 6 provide data on the number of days during a year when the 
daily change in exchange rate (Rupees per US dollar) has exceeded 10 paisa, 20 paisa, and 
30 paisa, respectively. 
Source: Reserve Bank of India. 
 
In the face of an unprecedented volume of capital flows during 2006-
08, the exchange rate appreciated by 17.8 percent from Rs. 46.54 per US 
dollar in August 2006 to Rs.39.51 per US dollar in October 2007. The 
rupee appreciated further to Rs.39.37 in January 2008; it thus appreciated 
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by 18.2 per cent with respect to the US $ between August 2006 and 
January 2008. 
As the sub-prime crisis broke out in August 2007 and the Fed started 
its rate cut cycle, capital flows to India jumped. RBI’s net purchases of 
foreign exchange were as much as US $ 49 billion over the 5-month 
period September 2007-January 2008 (Chart 4). In the subsequent period, 
oil prices jumped and capital flows dwindled. Following the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers, there were large outflows of portfolio capital. 
Accordingly, the exchange rate depreciated from Rs.39.37 per US dollar 
(January 2008) to Rs.51.23 (March 2009). Net sales of US $ 28 billion 
were witnessed during this period, with the bulk of them occurring in 
October 2008. Foreign exchange reserves fell to US $ 248 billion in 
November 2008 (reflecting both foreign exchange sales as well as 
valuation losses), but have recovered since then to US $ 280 billion (end-
September 2009). Nominal and real effective exchange rates have also 
fluctuated in tandem (Chart 5).  
As may be seen from this episode, there have been large two-way 
movements of the exchange rate. However, in view of lumpiness of flows 
and in order to avoid excessive volatility, the Reserve Bank intervened in 
the market to smoothen the adjustment process. Flexibility in the 
exchange rate also helps in avoiding excessive recourse to foreign 
currency debt by corporates. Adequate foreign exchange reserves 
buffeted the economy from the most volatile period of capital flows and the 
steep rise in risk aversion. 
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 Chart 5 
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How Open is the Indian Economy? 
Reflecting the liberalisation measures and the active capital account 
management, both current and capital account transactions have 
witnessed substantial increases since the early 1990s, especially in the 
current decade. Current account receipts have more than trebled from 8.2 
per cent of GDP in 1990-91 to 29.1 per cent in 2008-09; current account 
payments also nearly trebled over the same period (Table 8). India is now 
more open than the United States in the current account: in 2000, India’s 
overall current account openness (the ratio of current receipts and current 
payments to GDP) at 34.4 per cent was almost similar to that of the US 
(33.0 per cent). By 2008, India’s current account openness at 60.9 per 
cent was substantially higher than that of the US (41.1 per cent).  
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Turning to the capital account, after remaining range bound 
between 1990-91 and 2002-03, gross capital inflows and outflows, as a 
proportion of GDP, have since grown very rapidly. Gross capital inflows 
rose from 9.1 per cent of GDP in 2002-03 to 36.8 per cent in 2007-08, 
before moderating to 25.8 per cent in 2008-09 under the impact of the 
global financial crisis; gross capital account outflows rose from 7.0 per 
Table 8: India’s Balance of Payments – Current Account Transactions 
(Per cent to GDP)
Year Trade Account Invisibles Account Current account  
 Exports Imports Balance Receipts Payments Balance Receipts Payments
Current 
Account 
Balance
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1990-91 5.8 8.8 -3.0 2.4 2.4 -0.1 8.2 11.2 -3.0
1991-92 6.9 7.9 -1.0 3.6 2.9 0.7 10.5 10.8 -0.3
1992-93 7.3 9.6 -2.3 3.6 3.0 0.6 10.9 12.6 -1.7
1993-94 8.2 9.7 -1.5 4.1 3.1 1.0 12.3 12.8 -0.4
1994-95 8.3 11.1 -2.8 4.8 3.1 1.8 13.1 14.2 -1.0
1995-96 9.1 12.3 -3.2 5.0 3.4 1.5 14.1 15.7 -1.6
1996-97 8.8 12.6 -3.8 5.5 2.9 2.6 14.3 15.5 -1.2
1997-98 8.7 12.5 -3.8 5.6 3.2 2.4 14.3 15.7 -1.4
1998-99 8.2 11.4 -3.2 6.2 4.0 2.2 14.4 15.4 -1.0
1999-00 8.3 12.3 -4.0 6.7 3.8 2.9 15.0 16.1 -1.0
2000-01 9.9 12.6 -2.7 7.0 4.9 2.1 16.9 17.5 -0.6
2001-02 9.4 11.8 -2.4 7.7 4.6 3.1 17.1 16.4 0.7
2002-03 10.6 12.7 -2.1 8.3 4.9 3.4 18.9 17.6 1.2
2003-04 11.0 13.3 -2.3 8.9 4.3 4.6 19.9 17.6 2.3
2004-05 12.1 16.9 -4.8 9.9 5.5 4.4 22.0 22.4 -0.4
2005-06 13.0 19.4 -6.4 11.1 5.9 5.2 24.1 25.3 -1.2
2006-07 14.1 20.9 -6.8 12.5 6.8 5.7 26.6 27.7 -1.1
2007-08 14.2 22.0 -7.8 12.7 6.3 6.4 26.9 28.3 -1.5
2008-09 15.1 25.5 -10.4 14.0 6.3 7.7 29.1 31.8 -2.6
Memo: 
Amounts in US $ billion
1990-91 18 28 -9 8 8 0 26 36 -10
2002-03 54 64 -11 42 25 17 96 89 6
2007-08 166 258 -92 149 74 75 315 332 -17
2008-09 175 295 -119 163 73 90 338 368 -30
Source: Reserve Bank of India 
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cent to 25.2 per cent over the same period (Table 9). Reflecting these 
trends, the overall financial openness of the Indian economy - inflows and 
outflows on current and capital accounts taken together –increased from 
about 32 per cent in 1990-91 to 120 per cent in 2007-08 before 
moderating to 112 per cent in the crisis year.  
 Table 9: India's Balance of Payments - Capital Account 
      (Per cent to GDP) 
 Capital Account  Overall 
Balance of 
Payments 
Surplus 
(+)/Deficit(-) Year Inflows Outflows 
Net 
Capital 
Flows
Foreign 
Investment, 
net
Debt 
Flows, 
net
 
 
Others, 
net 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1990-91 7.2 4.9 2.3 0.0 2.2 0.0 -0.8
1991-92 8.8 7.3 1.4 0.0 1.6 -0.2 1.0
1992-93 8.8 7.2 1.2 0.2 1.0 0.4 -0.2
1993-94 10.5 7.3 3.5 1.5 1.1 0.6 3.1
1994-95 8.0 5.4 2.8 1.5 1.0 0.2 1.8
1995-96 6.9 5.6 1.3 1.3 0.9 -1.1 -0.3
1996-97 9.3 6.2 2.9 1.5 2.1 -0.5 1.7
1997-98 9.6 7.2 2.4 1.3 1.4 -0.4 1.1
1998-99 8.2 6.1 2.0 0.6 1.3 0.2 1.0
1999-00 9.0 6.7 2.5 1.1 0.7 0.5 1.4
2000-01 11.8 9.8 1.9 
(0.7)
1.3 1.7 
(0.5)
-1.0 1.3
2001-02 9.1 7.3 1.7 1.4 0.3 0.1 2.5
2002-03 9.1 7.0 2.1 0.8 -0.2 1.5 3.3
2003-04 12.6 9.8 2.9 2.3 -0.1 0.6 5.2
2004-05 14.0 10.0 4.1 1.9 1.5 0.7 3.7
2005-06 17.8 14.7 3.1 1.9 1.4 -0.1 1.9
   (3.8) (2.1)  
2006-07 25.5 20.5 4.9 1.6 3.2 0.1 4.0
2007-08 36.8 27.6 9.2 3.8 3.6 1.8 7.9
2008-09 25.8 25.2 0.8 0.3 0.7 -0.2 -1.7
Memo:    
 Amount in US $ billion
1990-91 23 16 7 0 7 0 -2
2002-03 46 35 11 4 -1 8 17
2007-08 433 325 108 45 42 21 92
2008-09 302 293 9 3 9 -3 -20
Note:  
1. Debt flows include external assistance, external commercial borrowings, short-term borrowings 
and non-resident deposits. 
2. Figures in parentheses in columns 4 and 6 are after excluding the impact of issuances (2001-02) 
and redemptions (2005-06) under India Millennium Deposits (IMDs).  
Source: Reserve Bank of India. 
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Thus, the policy regime in regard to the external sector as well as 
actual balance of payments data reveal an increasing degree of 
integration of the Indian economy with the global economy over the past 
couple of decades. Although the capital account is substantially open, it is 
managed and can be modulated by policy actions as illustrated earlier. 
Despite such a large change in India’s external openness, it is 
surprising that the well-known Chinn-Ito index (Chinn and Ito, 2008) for 
financial openness 6F6 for India is unchanged since 1970, except for a minor 
blip in 2000 (Annex 3). For other countries such as Thailand, Korea and 
Philippines, indices are also seen to suffer from inertia for extended 
periods. Perhaps, this can be attributed to the fact that such studies and 
the IMF’s AREAER view capital account openness as a binary event: 
either open or closed, when in fact it should be seen as process. Many 
studies attempting to decipher the impact of financial openness/capital 
controls on growth and other macroeconomic variables are based on such 
de jure indices. Conclusions of such studies should be suspect in view of 
the substantial divergence between the reality and the constructed index.  
 
 
 
                                                            
6 Chinn-Ito index for financial openness (KAOPEN) is based on the binary dummy 
variables that codify the tabulation of restrictions on cross-border financial transactions 
reported in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions (AREAER). The index takes into account the following four categories of 
restrictions: (1) presence of multiple exchange rates; (2) restrictions on current account 
transactions; (3) restrictions on capital account transactions; and (4) requirement of the 
surrender of export proceeds (Chinn and Ito, 2008). The authors have constructed the 
indices for 182 countries for the period 1970-2007. In their sample, the minimum and 
maximum values of the indices are (-) 1.81 and 2.53, respectively; the median value is (-) 
0.59. 
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Trends in Net Capital Inflows 
India has generally exhibited current account deficits barring a few 
episodes of small surplus, generally coinciding with a cyclical slowdown, 
as in the 3 year period from 2001-02 to 2003-04.  However, net capital 
flows have remained positive and in excess of the current account deficit 
throughout the whole period since the mid 1990s, leading to accumulation 
of foreign exchange reserves (Table 9).  Net capital flows were relatively 
modest, less than 3 percent of GDP throughout the decade ending in 
2003-04.  As elsewhere in the world, however, capital flows jumped after 
that.  During 2004-07, whereas the current account deficit averaged 0.9 
percent of GDP, net capital flows rose to 4.0 percent of GDP. 
Net capital inflows continued their upward trend during 2007-08, 
reaching a record high in excess of 9 per cent of GDP (US $ 108 billion) in 
2007-08. Reflecting these trends, the overall balance of payments surplus 
touched 7.9 per cent in 2007-08 as compared with an average of 3.2 per 
cent during 2004-07 and 3.7 per cent during 2001-04. However, net 
capital flows plummeted to US $ 8 billion (0.8 per cent of GDP) even as 
the current account deficit widened from 1.5 per cent of GDP in 2007-08 to 
2.6 per cent in 2008-09 (Tables 8 and 9). Thus, capital flows have 
exhibited substantial volatility. It is apparent that India has received excess 
capital flows which have posed challenges for monetary management. 
Yet, there have been recommendations for further opening up of capital 
account. For instance, IMF (2009a) observed that “given the country’s 
massive investment needs, it is essential that scarce fiscal resources be 
focused on jumpstarting infrastructure investment, together with further 
opening up to foreign inflows and developing the domestic corporate bond 
market to augment the needed financing” 
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Efficacy of Capital Account Management 
Key components of the capital account show movements in 
accordance with the policy framework. Thus, inward foreign direct 
investment (FDI) has increased from negligible levels in early 1990s to 3.0 
per cent of GDP in 2008-09. Outward FDI witnessed a significant jump 
from 2005-06 onwards to reach 1.5 per cent of GDP in 2008-09 reflecting 
policy changes encouraging such investments (Table 10). Unlike the 
secular upward trend in inward and outward FDI, portfolio flows are 
volatile, which is on expected lines. This volatility is clearly visible in 
monthly data. Monthly inflows by foreign institutional investors (FIIs) in 
equity markets have ranged between net inflows of US $ 7.1 billion 
(September 2007, i.e., just after the sub-prime crisis started in the US) and 
net outflows of US $ 9.0 billion (February 2008) (Chart 6). 
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Table 10: Capital Flows: Major Components 
(Per cent to GDP)
 Non-Debt Flows  Debt Flows 
Year 
Inward 
FDI, 
net 
Outward 
FDI,  
net 
Inward 
Portfolio, 
net
External 
Assistance, 
net
ECB, 
net
ECB 
Disbursements 
Short-term 
Borrowings, 
net
Non-
Resident 
Deposits, 
net
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1990-91 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.7 0.7 1.3 0.3 0.5
1991-92 0.0 0.0 0.0  1.1 0.5 1.2 -0.2 0.1
1992-93 0.1 0.0 0.1  0.8 -0.1 0.5 -0.4 0.8
1993-94 0.2 0.0 1.3  0.7 0.2 1.1 -0.3 0.4
1994-95 0.4 0.0 1.1  0.5 0.3 1.3 0.1 0.1
1995-96 0.6 0.1 0.7  0.2 0.4 1.2 0.0 0.3
1996-97 0.7 0.0 0.9  0.3 0.7 1.9 0.2 0.9
1997-98 0.9 0.0 0.4  0.2 1.0 1.8 0.0 0.3
1998-99 0.6 0.0 0.0  0.2 1.0 1.7 -0.2 0.2
1999-00 0.5 0.0 0.7  0.2 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.3
2000-01 0.9 0.2 0.6  0.1 0.9 2.1 0.1 0.5
    (-0.1) (0.9) 
2001-02 1.3 0.3 0.4  0.3 -0.3 0.6 -0.2 0.6
2002-03 1.0 0.4 0.2  -0.6 -0.3 0.7 0.2 0.6
2003-04 0.7 0.3 1.9  -0.5 -0.5 0.9 0.2 0.6
2004-05 0.9 0.3 1.3  0.3 0.8 1.3 0.5 -0.1
2005-06 1.1 0.7 1.5  0.2 0.3 1.8 0.5 0.3
    (1.0) (2.5) 
2006-07 2.5 1.6 0.8  0.2 1.8 2.2 0.7 0.5
2007-08 2.9 1.6 2.5  0.2 1.9 2.5 1.5 0.0
2008-09 3.0 1.5 -1.2   0.2 0.6 1.2 -0.5 0.4
Note: 
FDI: Foreign Direct Investment; ECB: External Commercial Borrowings. 
Figures in parentheses in columns 5 and 6 are after excluding the impact of issuances (2001-02) and redemptions 
(2005-06) under India Millennium Deposits (IMDs). 
Source: Reserve Bank of India        
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Chart 6 
 
 
Amongst debt flows, official aid is now almost negligible, and it is 
the external commercial borrowing (ECB) by non financial companies that 
dominates. Annual disbursements under ECBs generally move in line with 
investment demand in the economy and have hovered around 2 per cent 
of GDP, which is consistent with the policy of annual ceilings for such 
borrowings. Short-term borrowings have remained modest 7F7. Inflows under 
non-resident deposits have remained under one per cent of GDP (Table 
10). In brief, capital flows (net) have increased rapidly since 2003-04. 
They have been evenly balanced between debt and non-debt flows; they 
have also exhibited more volatility since early 2004 (Chart 7).  
                                                            
7 The increase in short-term borrowings during 2004-08, particularly in 2007-08, 
reflected the impact of higher international crude prices on the short term 
financing needs of domestic oil companies. 
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Chart 7 
 
 
Net Capital Flows to India: Cross-Country Perspective 
Net capital flows during 2007-08 were the highest in India’s history. 
Cross-country analysis indicates a number of interesting features. First, 
India was the largest recipient of net capital flows amongst all EMEs 
during 2007. With net capital flows of US $ 98 billion during 2007 
(calendar year basis), India was ahead of Russia (US $ 96 billion), Brazil 
(US$ 88 billion) and China (US $ 70 billion). India, thus, received one-sixth 
of net capital flows received by all EMEs during 2007 (Annex 4). Second, 
India was the third largest recipient of net capital flows during 2007 
amongst all countries - after US and Spain. Third, during 2008 – the year 
of crisis – India was the second highest recipient of net capital flows 
amongst EMEs (after Poland). Russia recorded large capital outflows (US 
$ 136 billion) in 2008 – a substantial turnaround from 2007. In fact, Russia 
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topped the list of EMEs that recorded outflows during 2008 followed by 
Korea. Fourth, at the global level, a clear flight to safety is seen in 2008 
towards euro area, whose capital flows jumped 10 times to US $ 446 
billion in 2008.  
The Indian experience with regard to capital flows reveals 
interesting differences with other major Asian EMEs. Net capital inflows to 
other Asian EMEs (with exception of China) have been relatively modest 
compared to India (even in terms of per cent to GDP) (Mohan and Kapur, 
2009). In all cases, except India, net capital flows during 2003-07 (per cent 
to GDP) were lower than their 1990-96 levels. These dynamics can 
perhaps be explained by slump in investment and growth rates in most of 
the Asian EMEs, except India and China, since the Asian crisis.   
The overall experience of EMEs, and that of India, is clearly one of 
broadly increasing volumes of and greater volatility in cross border capital 
flows, even as they have practised greater flexibility in their exchange rate 
regimes. Few EMEs practise the corner solutions of fixed exchange rates 
or completely open capital accounts. They have also practised flexibility in 
monetary policy frameworks and in financial regulation in the interest of 
preserving overall financial stability. Accordingly, we now turn to the 
details of Indian monetary and financial management as practised in 
recent years. 
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III. MONETARY MANAGEMENT IN THE FACE OF CAPITAL FLOW 
VOLATILITY 
 
Monetary Policy: Framework, Objectives and Instruments 
The conduct of monetary policy by the Reserve Bank is guided by the 
objective of maintenance of price stability and financial stability, while 
providing support to growth though adequate availability of credit. 
Furthermore, the Reserve Bank is also responsible for development and 
regulation of the banking sector and key segments of financial markets, 
foreign exchange management and public debt management. Globally, 
financial stability is emerging as an explicit objective for central banks only 
after the global financial crisis. In India, financial stability has been an 
explicit objective of the Reserve Bank since the early part of this decade. 
This reflected a combination of factors, namely, the growing degree of 
financial deregulation and liberalisation, low income levels and limited 
capacity of the majority of population to bear downside risks. Thus, unlike 
the trend towards single objective (price stability/inflation targeting), 
monetary policy framework in India is based on multiple objectives and 
multiple instruments.  
While price stability remains a key objective, an inflation targeting 
framework has not been considered appropriate for a variety of reasons: 
recurrent supply shocks from vagaries of the monsoon; large weight of 
food prices (46-70 per cent) in various consumer price indices; 
heterogeneity in consumption habits across different regions which render 
difficulty in acceptance of a single consumer price index for the country as 
a whole; large fiscal deficits and market borrowings; and, impediments to 
monetary transmission due to administered interest rates in some 
segments (Mohan, 2007; Subbarao, 2009). Apart from the Indian 
specifics, such a framework was – well before the current crisis hit us - 
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considered to be too narrow and unsuitable given the complexities that a 
central bank faces in its objectives (Mohan, 2004). The global financial 
crisis has now justified such concerns.  
In view of deregulation and liberalisation of the Indian economy that 
began in the early 1990s, and gradual development of financial markets, 
the monetary policy framework switched from the extant monetary 
targeting framework to a ‘multiple indicators’ approach in 1998. Under this 
framework, which continues to be in place, monetary policy signals are 
largely transmitted through modulations in policy rates (repo/reverse repo 
rates under the daily LAF). Unlike other major banks, no single/central rate 
is targeted. Rather, the Reserve Bank has preferred a band approach in 
view of large and recurrent exogenous shocks to liquidity emanating from 
volatility in capital flows and government cash flows. In case the Reserve 
Bank is in a tightening mode, the LAF repo rate becomes the effective 
signalling rate; in the case of accommodative stance, the LAF reverse 
repo rate takes the place of the signalling rate.  
Along with changes in policy rates, the width of the repo-reverse repo 
rate corridor has also been used as an instrument of signalling. The width 
has varied between 100 and 300 basis points and is 150 basis points at 
present (September 2009). The width reflects evolving macroeconomic 
and monetary conditions, trends in capital flows as well as the level of 
uncertainty. We have been amongst a few banks where corridor width has 
been employed as an instrument of monetary policy. In the context of 
corridor width, it is interesting to note the following observations of Charles 
Goodhart (2009):  
“While decisions on the level of the official rate, within this 
corridor, are much more important than adjustments to the 
parameters of the corridor itself, nevertheless the latter could 
become a flexible and subtle further instrument”.  
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“In several cases around the world, these margins have 
been set, often by historical tradition, at plus, or minus, some round 
number, often 1%, and then left there as a constant, irrespective of 
economic conjuncture, or the positions of either the banking sector 
as a whole, or of individual banks within it, with the Central Bank”. 
“Treating these parameters as a constant would be a waste 
of a good instrument. ...(T)his spread should have narrowed as we 
moved from pre-crisis peace-time to war-time crisis conditions”.  
“The parameters of the 'corridor' could, and should be 
managed in a more flexible, subtle and intelligent way than has 
been generally done to date”. 
 
In addition, in view of the large potential changes in monetary 
aggregates, largely caused by the volatility in capital flows, the Reserve 
Bank also uses changes in instruments such as the “Cash Reserve Ratio” 
(CRR) and the “Statutory Liquidity Ratio” (SLR) 8F8 to modulate liquidity in 
the system, and to keep the trends in monetary aggregates within the 
desired trajectories.  Sterilisation operations have been an important 
component of monetary management in the face of volatile capital flows. 
Furthermore, as will be detailed later, prudential regulations have been 
used in an integrated manner as supplements to overall monetary policy. 
Such measures have generally been used to respond to the observation 
of large movements in credit growth to certain sectors, particularly when 
such movement could lead to excessive growth in asset prices with 
potential effects on financial stability. 
 
Sterilisation Operations 
While efforts have been made to liberalise capital outflows and restrict 
debt flows, capital inflows (net) have been, for most of the time, above 
                                                            
8 The SLR regulation mandates the banks to invest a specified proportion (at present 24 percent) 
of their net demand and time liabilities (NDTL) in government (and other specified) securities. 
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financing requirements. Excess foreign exchange flows are absorbed by 
the Reserve Bank and equivalent rupee liquidity is provided to banks. 
Absorption of excess capital flows by a central bank has implications for 
domestic monetary and liquidity conditions and, beyond a limit, such 
absorptions can be inflationary and lead to a vicious circle of bust and 
boom. Rather than relying on a single instrument, a combination of 
instruments has been used in India to neutralise the expansionary impact 
of foreign exchange purchases on domestic monetary and liquidity 
conditions. These include: open market operations, market stabilisation 
scheme, cash reserve ratio, liquidity adjustment facility, and, at times, 
modulation in Centre’s surplus cash balances. 
Fiscal dominance of the 1970s and 1980s had left a large pool of 
Government securities with the Reserve Bank and such assets dominated 
the Reserve Bank’s balance sheet in the early 1990s. Foreign exchange 
assets constituted only a miniscule proportion. Thus, as capital flows 
increased from 1993-94 onwards, such accumulated holdings of 
government securities came in handy for sterilisation purposes and  open 
market operations (OMO) in government securities were the main 
instrument of sterilisation for almost a decade. By 2003-04, however, the 
stock of such securities had dwindled on the back of continuous 
sterilisation operations.  The Reserve Bank of India Act prohibits issuance 
of its own securities by the Reserve Bank. Furthermore, the Reserve 
Bank’s LAF operations are collateralised against government securities. 
Absorption of liquidity under reverse repos is against government 
securities held in RBI’s portfolio and vice versa for repos. Therefore, a 
certain stock of government securities is required to be held by RBI for 
normal monetary management. 
In view of the finite stock of government securities in the RBI’s balance 
sheet, the provisions of the RBI Act prohibiting issuance of its own 
48 
 
securities, and need for  government securities for operating the LAF, an 
innovation in the form of Market Stabilisation Scheme (MSS) was 
introduced in 2004. Under the MSS, the Reserve Bank of India is 
authorized by the Government to issue Government Treasury bills/bonds 
to offset the expansionary impact of capital inflows, up to a specified limit.  
MSS securities are identical to normal government securities in the hands 
of the investors and there is no distinction between the two. However, 
MSS proceeds are impounded in a separate account with the Reserve 
Bank and these can only be used for redemption 9F9. Interest payments on 
MSS securities are borne by the Government and these payments are 
shown in the budget documents – these have averaged only 0.13 per cent 
of GDP over the period 2004-09. MSS operates symmetrically: during 
episodes of capital outflows, liquidity is injected into the banking system 
through normal redemptions as well as active buybacks. This imparts 
flexibility to the conduct of monetary policy. Thus, liquidity was injected 
quickly through such unwinding during 2008-09 and 2009-10 as capital 
flows reversed following the failure of Lehman Brothers. Although the 
interest burden on MSS operations is borne by the government, the fiscal 
cost incurred is compensated by the transfer of higher surplus transferable 
profits from the Reserve Bank. This higher transfer is enabled by the 
higher accretion of RBI earnings on account of enhanced foreign 
exchange reserves, with the increment in reserves being significantly 
higher than the issuance of MSS securities (Table 11).  
 
 
                                                            
9 In view of large jump in fiscal deficit and market borrowing requirements on the back of 
stimulus measures in the aftermath of global financial crisis, a part (Rs.400 billion) of 
MSS proceeds impounded with the Reserve Bank was permitted to be desequestered in 
two stages (March 2009 and May 2009), consistent with the announced government 
borrowing programme. 
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Table 11: Market Stabilisation Scheme in India  
(Rupees billion)
Item 2004-
05
2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09
1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Balances under Market Stabilisation Scheme 
(MSS) (outstanding, end-March) 
642 291 630 1,684 881
2. Interest paid by the Government on issuances 
under the MSS during the year (April-March) 
21
(0.07)
34
(0.09)
26 
(0.06) 
84
(0.18)
124
(0.23)
3. Foreign Currency Assets of the Reserve Bank 
(outstanding, end-March) 
5,931 6,473 8,366 11,960 12,301
4. Net Disposable Income of the Reserve Bank 
during the year (July-June) 
54 84 114 150 250
5. Surplus Transfer from the Reserve Bank to the 
Central Government during the year (July-June) 
54 84 114 @ 150 250
Memo:  
Net issuance (+)/redemption of MSS during the 
year 
642 -351 279 1054 -803
@: Excluding profits on sale of shares of State Bank of India. 
Figures in parentheses are per cent to GDP  
 
Source: Reserve Bank of India; Budget Documents, Government of India. 
 
 
 
Liquidity Management 
Like China and other countries, the cash reserve ratio (CRR) has been 
deployed to moderate the impact of volatility in capital flows on domestic 
monetary and credit aggregates and prevent overheating between 2004 to 
around mid-2008 (Mohan, 2008a). Thus, CRR was raised from 4.5 per 
cent in March 2004 to 9.0 per cent by July 2008. As capital flows reversed, 
the increases were rolled back between September 2008 and January 
2008 (Chart 8). While the increase in the CRR was gradual, the reversal 
was quick to compensate for the liquidity drain caused by forex 
interventions resulting from rapid capital outflows after the Lehman 
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bankruptcy. The domestic banking system was thus largely insulated from 
both the large influx and the subsequent reversal of capital flows.  
 
 
 
Reserve requirements, along with MSS, provided a liquidity cushion 
that could be released when the banks faced greater funding difficulties. 
Banks could be given back their own liquidity and there was no need for 
any dilution of collateral accepted by the Reserve Bank for injection of 
liquidity into the system. Actual/potential liquidity through these measures 
amounted to Rs. 5,617 billion (10.6 per cent of GDP for the year 2008-09) 
(Table 12). In view of these factors, ample liquidity was provided to the 
banking system and this is reflected in continuous absorption under 
reverse repos since December 2008. During January-July 2009, daily 
liquidity absorbed under LAF reverse repos averaged around Rs.900 
billion (reaching Rs.1,300 billion in July 2009) (Chart 9).  However, even 
as there has been ample liquidity in the banking system, there has been 
no visible expansion of RBI’s balance sheet and reserve money. This is in 
contrast to the sharp expansion of balance sheets in major advanced 
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economies. Ample liquidity, without any observed expansion in RBI’s 
balance sheet, can be attributed to fact that CRR balances are a part of 
reserve money. Reduction in CRR shows up as reduction in reserve 
money, as explained in detail later. In view of CRR impact, reserve money 
should be adjusted for the policy-induced change. A cursory look at 
balance sheet and reserve money dynamics can be misleading. 
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Table 12: Actual/Potential Release of Primary Liquidity 
 (since mid-September 2008) 
   
Measure/Facility  Amount
    (Rs. billion) 
Monetary Policy Operations (1 to 3) 
1. Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) Reduction  1,600 
2.Open Market Operations 801
3. MSS Unwinding/De-sequestering  1,555
Extension of Liquidity Facilities (4 to 8) 
4. Term Repo Facility @ 600
5. Increase in Export Credit Refinance  # 266
6. Special Refinance Facility for SCBs (Non-RRB) $ 385
7. Refinance Facility for SIDBI/NHB/EXIM Bank  160
8. Liquidity Facility for NBFCs through SPV @@ 250
Total (1 to 8)  5,617
Memo:   
Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) Reduction  400
Notes: 
@: 14-days term repo facility instituted under the LAF to enable banks to ease 
liquidity stress faced by mutual funds (MFs), non-banking financial companies 
(NBFCs) and housing finance companies. 
 
#: The export credit refinance (ECR) limit was increased from 15 per cent of the 
outstanding rupee export credit eligible for refinance to 50 per cent.  
 
$: Introduced under Section 17(3B) of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 to 
provide all scheduled commercial banks (excluding RRBs) refinance from the 
Reserve Bank equivalent to up to 1.0 per cent of their respective net demand and 
time liabilities (NDTL) up to a maximum period of 90 days.  
 
@@: To address the temporary liquidity constraints of systemically important non-
deposit taking NBFCs (NBFCs-ND-SI), the Government set up a special purpose 
vehicle (SPV). The SPV was allowed to mobilise resources through issuance of 
government guaranteed securities (for investment in CPs and NCDs of NBFCs-ND-
SI) to be purchased by the Reserve Bank.  
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Chart 9 
 
 
While CRR and MSS have been used to sterilise relatively durable 
capital flows, repo/reverse operations under the daily liquidity adjustment 
facility (LAF) help to manage transient liquidity shortfalls/surpluses in the 
money market. Within the MSS operations there is built in flexibility to deal 
with the durability of inflows, or otherwise, on an ex post basis. MSS 
securities are issued with maturities ranging from 91 day treasury bills to 
longer term government securities with maturities of up to about 3 years. 
So the sterilised liquidity can be unwound on a flexible basis depending on 
the pattern of capital flows. LAF operations, as elaborated later, have 
been an important tool of monetary management in the face of capital 
flows. In the case of MSS, as noted earlier, the burden is borne by the 
government. In the case of LAF operations, the burden of excess liquidity 
absorbed under reverse repos is borne by the Reserve Bank. Finally, in 
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the case of CRR, the burden is now borne by banks. Amendment to the 
RBI Act in 2007 prohibits the Reserve Bank from paying interest on CRR 
balances. Prior to this, the required CRR balances earned interest. At 
present, the burden of sterilisation is thus shared between the 
government, the Reserve Bank and banks.    
Apart from policy actions of CRR, OMOs, and MSS, in the context of 
sterilisation, it needs to be recognised that a fast growing economy like 
India needs a corresponding expansion in monetary aggregates, which 
then have to be underpinned by an appropriate expansion of the central 
bank’s balance sheet, which can be through expansion of domestic assets 
or foreign assets. If it is through expansion of foreign assets, it is apparent 
that if the foreign assets acquired by the central bank through its market 
interventions are consistent with the desired base money growth they 
need not be sterilised. Thus, only part of the increase in the central bank’s 
balance sheet through accretion of foreign assets needs to be sterilized If 
the accretion is in excess of the required base money growth. For 
instance, during 2007-08, RBI’s market purchases of foreign exchange 
amounted to US $ 78 billion, while currency demand amounted to Rs. 856 
billion (around US $ 21 billion). Thus, only US $ 57 billion (around three-
fourths of intervention during the year) was required to be sterilised. More 
generally, it is clear that sterilisation coefficient would be less than unity. 
Sterilisation operations through CRR, OMOs and MSS take into account 
absorption through currency demand as well as through existing levels of 
CRR (Table 13). Finally, LAF balances liquidity surpluses/shortfalls on a 
daily basis. Therefore, looking at only MSS and OMOs as instruments of 
sterilisation and arguing that sterilisation was partial, is analytically 
incorrect (e.g. Shah and Patnaik (2008)). 
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Table 13: Sterilisation Operations by the Reserve Bank of India 
Rupees billion
  Item 
2003-
04
2004-
05
2005-
06
2006-
07 
2007-
08 
2008-
09
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 
Market Purchases(+)/Sales(-) of Foreign 
Currency by RBI 1407 911 329 1190 3121 -1786
        
2 Management of Liquidity (I + ii + iii ) -1398 -1076 -429 -1219 -2804 1574
 (i) Policy Actions (a to c) -356 -732 459 -607 -1389 2870
     (a) Change in CRR (first round) 35 -90 0 -275 -470 1023
    (b) MSS Operations 0 -642 351 -339 -1054 803
    (c) OMOs -391 0 107 7 135 1045
        
 (ii) Other Factors (a to c) -720 -497 -1009 -976 -1626 -778
      (a) Currency with public -434 -409 -573 -698 -856 -979
      (b) Existing CRR  -108 -93 -209 -267 -504 -402
  
    (c) Surplus cash balance of the Central 
         Government with RBI -178 5 -227 -12 -266 604
 
(iii) LAF Operations -322 153 121 364 212 -518
Note:  
CRR: Cash Reserve Ratio; MSS: Market Stabilization Scheme; LAF: Liquidity Adjustment Facility;  
OMOs: Open Market Operations 
(-) indicates absorption of liquidity from the banking system and (+) indicates injection of liquidity. 
Source: Reserve Bank of India 
 
 
A usual concern with sterilisation is that it involves quasi-fiscal costs 
as the central bank sheds high-yielding domestic securities for low-
yielding foreign assets. While factually true, such arguments ignore the 
fact that the quasi-fiscal and other costs of sterilization can be 
compensated by the returns obtained from the higher amount of forex 
reserve accumulation and, furthermore, are also likely to be outweighed 
by the benefits that may emanate from the maintenance of domestic 
macroeconomic and financial stability. Large reserves apparently lower 
spreads on overseas borrowing costs of domestic corporates. In the 
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current crisis, as in previous crises, the large build-up of forex reserves by 
the major EMEs over the last decade has been a useful first-line of 
defence. In the absence of such war chests, more disruptive changes 
would have been forced on the EMEs. However, a prolonged period of 
large-scale intervention, as the sole policy response to manage large and 
growing volume of capital inflows, can create expectations of future 
exchange rate appreciation and runs the risk of creating distortions in the 
local financial system. There are, however, good grounds for believing 
such dangers can be reduced when forex intervention is combined with a 
policy orientation that allows currency flexibility over a medium term 
perspective in conjunction with continuous development and strengthening 
of the domestic financial sector, as has been the Indian approach.  
 
Transmission to Money Market Rates   
For monetary impulses to be transmitted to the real economy, money 
markets play a key role. Stability in money markets is critical for smooth 
transmission of monetary impulses to other financial markets and the rest 
of the economy. In this context, repo/reverse operations under the LAF 
manage transient liquidity shortfalls/surpluses in the money market. Apart 
from capital flows, another factor impacting short-term liquidity conditions 
is Government cash balances. There is lumpiness in tax inflows, which is 
witnessed every quarter. This is mainly on account of direct taxes. The 
lumpiness has been accentuated by the growing share of direct taxes in 
overall taxes.  Advance tax flows at the end of every quarter lead to large 
withdrawal of liquidity from the banking system, putting upward pressure 
on money market rates. The combination of OMOs, MSS, CRR and LAF 
operations have enabled us to generally keep the overnight money market 
rates within the informal corridor provided by repo and reverse repo rates.  
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In the aftermath of the failure of Lehman Brothers, various financial 
markets felt large pressures on the back of large FII outflows. There was a 
large demand for rupee liquidity from a variety of sources and money 
market rates rose beyond the upper band.  The effective use of multiple 
instruments at the command of RBI to inject liquidity – successive cuts in 
CRR, redemption/buyback of MSS securities, cut in SLR and other 
windows – were successful and money market rates quickly fell within the 
corridor (Chart 10). While some pressure was felt in the money markets 
and other financial prices, the whole segment of financial markets 
continued to function normally. There was no loss of trust amongst the 
market players. Thus, overall, reasonable stability has been maintained in 
money markets. Our experience strongly supports the need for a central 
bank to have multiple instruments to manage the sudden vicissitudes in 
liquidity conditions. 
Chart 10    
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Prudential Regulation and Financial Stability 
India’s approach to the management of volatile capital flows has not 
been restricted to capital account management and foreign exchange 
intervention accompanied by appropriate sterilization.  It has also been 
supplemented by the recognition that such flows can cause financial 
sector responses that need direct prudential regulation of financial 
intermediaries. 
One cause of policy concern with excessive capital flows is that they 
encourage credit booms, especially in speculative activities, and can also 
create maturity and currency mismatches for banks. Various prudential 
measures have been taken to address this concern.  First, banks access 
to external borrowings is subject to an overall ceiling, linked to their 
unimpaired Tier I capital. Second, debt liabilities in the form of NRI 
deposits are also managed through interest rate ceilings and minimum 
maturity requirements. Third, since high credit growth was observed in 
certain sectors such as real estate and stock markets, specific sectoral 
measures had to be undertaken.  Prudential norms –provisioning norms 
and risk weights – were tightened during 2005-2007 in regard to these 
specific sectors. The prudential norms were rolled back in late 2008 in the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis (Tables 14 and 15).  
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Table 14: Standard Asset Provisioning Requirements for Commercial Banks in India 
(Per cent)
Sr. 
No. 
Category of Standard Asset March
2005
November 
2005
May 
2006 
January 
2007
November 
2008
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Direct advances to the agricultural and SME sectors 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
2. Residential housing loans beyond Rs. 2 million 0.25 0.40 1.00 1.00 0.40
3. Personal loans (including credit card receivables), 
loans and advances qualifying as capital market 
exposures and commercial real estate loans 0.25 0.40 1.00 2.00 0.40
4. Loans and advances to non-deposit taking  
systemically important non-banking finance 
companies (NBFCs) 0.25 0.40 0.40 2.00 0.40
5. All other loans and advances not included above 0.25 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40
Source: Reserve Bank of India. 
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Table 15: Risk Weight Requirements for Capital Adequacy 
(Per cent)
Category of Asset March 
2006 
May 
2006
September  
2006
January 
2007
May 
2007
May 
2008 
November 
2008
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Commercial Real Estate 125 150 150 150 150  150  100
Capital Market Exposure 125 125 125 125 125 125 125
Investment in Venture 
capital funds 
100 150 150 150 150 150 150
Exposures to NBFC-ND-SI 100 100 100 125 125 125  100
Residential housing loans 
extended to individuals 
against mortgage of housing 
properties (For loans up to 
Rs. 2 million only) 
75 75 75 75  50 * *
Investments in MBS of 
HFCs, recognized and 
supervised by NHB 
75 75 75 50 50  50 50
Exposure of banks to 
entities to set up  
SEZ/acquisition of units in 
SEZ 
100 100 150 150 150  150 150
Note: 
*: Risk weights linked to loan-to-value (LTV) ratios as below: 
LTV Ratio Sanctioned Amount of Loan Risk Weight 
= or < 75 % Up to Rs.3 million 50% 
= or < 75 % Above Rs.3 million 75% 
> 75 % Irrespective of the amount 100% 
 
NBFC-ND-SI: Non-Banking Financial Company – Non-Deposit taking – Systemically Important 
MBS: Mortgage Backed Securities; HFCs: Housing Finance Companies; NHB: National Housing Bank; 
SEZ: Special Economic Zones 
 
Source: Reserve Bank of India 
 
 
These measures appear to have moderated credit growth to 
commercial real estate to a certain extent from the very high levels of 
around 150 per cent (year-on-year) in late 2005 to around 50 per cent by 
2008 (Chart 11). Whereas these measures were taken in a judgemental 
ad hoc manner in India, a more systematic approach to dynamic 
provisioning is now being internationally accepted and recommended. 
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Such an integrated approach combining monetary and prudential 
instruments in India was facilitated by the fact that both monetary policy 
and financial regulation responsibilities have been entrusted to a single 
agency (Reserve Bank of India) (Mohan, 2009a; 2009c).  
Chart 11 
 
 
Development and Regulation of Financial Markets 
In order to enhance monetary transmission as well as improve the 
efficiency in resource allocation, continuous actions have been taken by 
the Reserve Bank to deepen, widen and integrate various segments of 
financial market under its purview, while taking a cautious approach in 
regard to exotic instruments. Volatility in currency and bond markets can 
have significantly more adverse employment, output and distributional 
consequences compared to volatility in equity markets. Furthermore, 
interest rates and inflation rate in India remain higher that in major 
advanced economies and EMEs. Pre-mature liberalisation of money and 
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bond markets can lead to large flows of hot money, which could 
exacerbate macroeconomic and monetary management. In recognition of 
these possible destabilising factors from cross-border developments, the 
liberalisation of domestic financial markets in India has been accompanied 
with prudential safeguards. Enhancing efficiency while at the same time, 
avoiding instability in the system, has been the challenge for the 
regulators in India. This approach to development and regulation of 
financial markets has imparted resilience to the financial markets, vividly 
reflected in their ability to withstand a series of financial crises including 
the latest global financial crisis.  
Turnover in financial markets has seen a significant increase over the 
years. The bid-ask spread of Rupee/US$ in the foreign exchange market 
has almost converged with that of other major currencies in the 
international market. On some occasions, in fact, the bid-ask spread of 
Rupee/US$ market was lower than that of some major currencies (Mohan, 
2007b). Currency futures were introduced in 2008, while interest rate 
futures were reintroduced in 2009. In contrast to developments in 
advanced economies, various segments of the financial market generally 
functioned normally in the aftermath of Lehman Brothers’ failure.  
Apart from banks, NBFCs and other financial institutions, RBI regulates 
the money market, the government securities market, the credit market 
and the foreign exchange market and the derivatives thereon. In respect 
of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, only those derivatives where one 
party to the transaction is an RBI regulated entity have legal validity. In 
respect of products traded on the exchanges, procedures for trade 
execution fall within the regulatory purview of Securities and Exchange 
Board of India (SEBI). Therefore, unlike many countries, India has had 
established procedures for regulation of OTC derivatives.  
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The present arrangement of regulation of financial markets has 
demonstrated its efficacy over time, while it has also preserved financial 
stability. Nonetheless, there have been recommendations by two 
committees – High Powered Committee on Mumbai as an International 
Financial Centre (Chairman: Percy Mistry) (Government of India, 2007) 
and Committee on Financial Sector Reforms (Chairman: Raghuram 
Rajan) (Government of India, 2008) - that regulation of all trading of 
financial products and instruments be brought under SEBI. In this context, 
as noted earlier, unlike equity prices, interest rates and exchange rate are 
key macroeconomic variables with implications for monetary policy and 
overall macroeconomic stability. In addition, banks dominate the interest 
and exchange rate markets. By also being the regulator of these markets, 
the Reserve Bank is in a position to exercise oversight of institutions, 
markets and products, to monitor market developments, sense impending 
developments, take advance action, prevent excessive volatility and 
maintain financial stability at the systemic level (Subbarao, 2009). Similar 
arguments apply to calls for separation of banking regulation from 
monetary policy. Such recommendations were based on model that was 
prevalent in the UK and elsewhere. The crisis has questioned the merits of 
such a framework and these frameworks are being re-examined in these 
countries (Turner Review, 2009; Mohan, 2009c). In view of these factors, 
the advisability of entrusting regulation of all financial markets trading to 
an agency outside RBI needs to be revisited. In this context, it is relevant 
to note that globally banking supervision is mostly entrusted to central 
banks (Annex 5).  
While changes in policy repo/reverse repo rates have emerged as a 
key instrument of monetary policy signalling, there are some impediments 
to their efficacy. First, financial markets are still not fully developed. 
Second, there are certain structural rigidities such as administered interest 
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rates in respect of small savings (postal deposits and public provident fund 
etc) as well as for certain categories of borrowers (agriculture, export 
credit, and loans up to Rs.200,000). Third, although fiscal deficits had 
come down by 2007, they were still high by international standards. Fiscal 
deficits and market borrowings have jumped substantially in the past 
couple of years under the impact of fiscal stimulus measures necessitated 
by the global financial crisis. Fiscal deficits are now at their highest levels. 
Finally, large and volatile capital flows have been a key driver of liquidity. 
In view of all these factors, along with policy rates, cash reserve ratio 
remains an important instrument of monetary and liquidity management. 
While the long-run policy objective continues to be to reduce it to 3 per 
cent, it is considered desirable and prudent to use CRR to reinforce the 
effectiveness of policy rates. 
This review of Indian monetary policy operations and associated 
financial sector regulatory measures has illustrated the complexity in 
overall macro and financial management that has had to be practised in 
the face of volatile capital flows. How successful have these policy 
operations been in achieving the objective of ensuring an adequate growth 
momentum in the economy while preserving price and financial stability? It 
is to the documentation of these outcomes that we now turn. 
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IV. OUTCOMES: WAS MONETARY POLICY INDEPENDENT? 
 
Reserve Money, Credit and Money Supply 
A common concern with foreign exchange market interventions is that 
they can lead to excessive expansion in monetary aggregates, and turn 
out to be inflationary. What has been the Indian experience in this regard? 
While volatility in capital flows has posed continuous challenges to 
monetary policy, the flexible usage of various sterilisation and liquidity 
management instruments ensured that growth in monetary and credit 
aggregates was largely consistent with requirements of the real economy. 
There was, however, some acceleration in monetary and credit growth 
during 2004-08, the period of enhanced capital flows, particularly that in 
credit growth. While it partly reflected the impact of capital inflows, it was 
also the outcome of increased real demand arising from strong real 
activity: real GDP growth accelerated to an average of 9.0 per cent during 
the 5-year period 2003-08 from 5.7 per cent during the preceding 5-year 
period (1998-2003) (Table 16).  
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Table 16: Capital Flows and Monetary Management  
Year 
Capital 
Inflows 
(net)  
(US $ 
billion) 
RBI's 
Purchase(+)/ 
Sale(-) of Foreign 
Exchange (US $ 
billion)
Variation in Monetary and Credit 
Aggregates (Per cent) 
Real 
GDP 
Growth 
(Per 
cent) 
Reserve 
Money
Reserve 
Money 
(adjusted 
for CRR)
Money 
supply 
(M3) 
Bank 
Credit 
(Non-
food)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1989-90 7.0 n.a 23.2  19.4 18.5 6.1
1990-91 7.2 n.a 13.1  15.1 12.4 5.3
1991-92 3.8 n.a 13.4  19.3 8.2 1.4
1992-93 2.9 n.a 11.3  14.8 20.1 5.4
1993-94 9.7 n.a 25.2  18.4 5.7 5.7
1994-95 9.2 n.a 22.1  22.4 29.8 6.4
1995-96 4.7 n.a 14.9  13.6 22.5 7.3
1996-97 11.4 7.8 2.8  16.2 10.9 8.0
1997-98 10.0 3.8 13.2  18.0 15.1 4.3
1998-99 8.3 1.8 14.5  19.4 13.0 6.7
1999-2000 11.1 3.2 8.2  14.6 16.5 6.4
2000-01 8.5 2.4 8.1  16.8 14.9 4.4
2001-02 8.4 7.1 11.4  14.1 13.6 5.8
2002-03 10.6 15.7 9.2  14.7 26.9 3.8
2003-04 17.3 30.5 18.3 19.2 16.7 18.4 8.5
2004-05 28.6 20.8 12.1 10.0 11.8 27.5 7.5
2005-06 30.5 8.1 16.9 16.9 16.9 31.8 9.5
2006-07 46.4 26.8 23.9 19.1 21.7 28.5 9.7
2007-08 108.0 78.2 31.0 25.3 21.4 23.0 9.0
2008-09 8.0 -34.9 6.4 19.0 18.6 17.8 6.7
n.a: not available 
Source: Reserve Bank of India 
 
 
The higher acceleration in credit growth relative to that of broad 
money supply (M3) was enabled by the drawdown of excess initial stocks 
of government securities in banks’ balance sheets.  During the period of 
the cyclical economic slowdown (1998-2003), the banks had exhibited a 
preference for investing in risk free government security assets rather than 
doing commercial lending, thereby accumulating stocks of government 
securities far in excess of the required SLR of 25 per cent.  
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As credit growth accelerated beginning 2002-03 onwards, banks 
divested their excess SLR investments to meet credit demand. 
Accordingly, growth in credit was higher than that in money supply. Thus, 
higher credit growth was also due to leeway provided by excess SLR 
holdings (Chart 12).  
Chart 12 
 
 
It is important to stress that unlike many other central banks, where 
monetary and credit aggregates have seen benign neglect, these 
variables remain important information variables in RBI’s conduct of 
monetary policy. During the episode of high growth in monetary and credit 
aggregates, the Reserve Bank in its monetary policy statements opined 
that that high growth in such aggregates, in conjunction with other demand 
indicators, was indicative of possible overheating of the economy. 
Accordingly, at the aggregate level, credit and monetary growth was 
restrained through tightening of policy rates and absorption of liquidity 
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through CRR, MSS and OMOs.  In addition, sectoral concerns over high 
credit growth in specific sectors such as real estate, as noted earlier, were 
addressed through tightening of prudential norms. 
Although there was strong growth in credit and monetary aggregates 
during 2004-08, managing such aggregates at the appropriate rate of 
growth poses challenges for monetary authorities in EMEs such as India.  
During a period of rapid growth, change in traditional estimates of money 
multipliers is difficult to predict in the presence of financial deepening.  For 
example, the credit GDP ratio should be expected to rise, as new entities 
get financed and hitherto excluded segments of the population get access 
to and start using banking services.  Therefore, as the growth process 
strengthens and becomes more inclusive, it is expected that demand for 
financial products would continue to witness high growth in the coming 
years. If so, growth in bank credit and monetary aggregates could be 
higher than what might be expected from historical relationships and 
estimated elasticities in view of ongoing structural changes. This raises 
critical issues for the central bank such as the appropriate order of 
monetary/credit expansion. Thus, the Reserve Bank will have to face 
ongoing challenges to provide appropriate liquidity to the system so as to 
ensure growth in non-inflationary environment. This raises the critical 
issues of clarity in reading signs of inflation, asset prices and systemic 
liquidity from monetary/credit expansion (Mohan 2008 b). 
 
Reserve Money and CRR: Analytics 
In analysing the growth in reserve (bank) money (M0), it is misleading 
to draw conclusions from the headline numbers.  During the periods of 
large capital inflows that led to large forex interventions by the RBI, as part 
of the sterilization strategy, liquidity was impounded, inter alia, through 
increases in the Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) mandating banks to maintain 
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higher proportions of their liabilities as reserves (unremunerated since 
2007) with the Reserve Bank.  Increases in CRR, even as they impound 
excess liquidity from the banking system, end up showing a higher 
expansion in reserve money and the Reserve Bank’s balance sheet.  
Broad money expansion is constrained since this results in reduction of 
the money multiplier, with CRR balances being impounded and not being 
available for credit expansion with the banks.  Furthermore, since CRR 
balances are no longer remunerated, banks do not maintain large excess 
reserves 10F10. Banks prefer to park excess funds in reverse repos under the 
LAF (see Chart). Thus, CRR balances almost fully reflect impounded 
reserves. Nonetheless, as CRR is raised, reserve money growth is 
observed to be higher. The reverse happens when the CRR is cut. During 
2004-08, reserve money growth was overstated because of CRR. The 
situation has reversed since October 2008: due to reduction in CRR, 
growth in headline reserve money is lower, even though banks have been 
provided with greater liquidity that can be used for lending or investment. 
It is, therefore, important to analyse variations in reserve money 
adjusted for the impact of policy-induced changes in CRR. It is because of 
the accounting conventions that the Reserve Bank reports data for 
increase in reserve money, net of the CRR impact. Such an analysis 
shows that growth in reserve money has been relatively stable even as 
net foreign assets had shown large increase/decrease (Table 16). In view 
of the above, the observations of various analysts [e.g. Shah and Patnaik 
(2008); Grenville (2008)] that incomplete sterilisation in the post-2004 
period led to acceleration in reserve money growth is mistaken. Moreover, 
Grenville uses variation in net foreign assets and not actual market 
interventions data to reach conclusions on growth of base money. 
                                                            
10 Prior to the 2007 amendment to the RBI Act, only required reserves were remunerated. 
Excess reserves were not remunerated even at that time. 
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Variation in net foreign assets includes both market sale/purchase of 
foreign exchange and also changes due to valuation which can be sizable. 
There are periods when net foreign assets vary even though there have 
been no market interventions. It is only the variation in market purchases 
of foreign exchange by the central bank that have implications for reserve 
money, not the variation in the stock of foreign assets. At times, net 
foreign assets and market purchases can move in opposite directions; for 
example, during 2008-09, net foreign assets of the Reserve Bank 
increased by Rs.440 billion, while the Reserve Bank actually sold foreign 
exchange worth Rs. 1,786 billion during the year. More generally, data 
nuances need to be understood carefully. Many other countries also use 
cash reserve ratios. Cross-country studies typically take headline reserve 
money growth in their analysis and run the risk of reaching wrong 
conclusions.  
Financial Sector Development: Growth with Enhanced Efficiency and 
Stability 
Strong export growth, jump in domestic savings and investment, 
strengthening of the financial sector, deepening and widening of financial 
markets have also been witnessed in the recent years. Domestic savings 
jumped from 24.8 per cent of GDP in 1999-2000 to 37.7 per cent in 2007-
08, while investment rate rose from 25.9 per cent of GDP to 39.1 per cent 
over the same period. Non-performing assets fell from 6.8 per cent of net 
advances (March 2000) to 1.1 per cent (March 2009), despite tightening of 
recognition norms towards the international standard of 90 days. Capital to 
risk-weighted assets ratio (CRAR) improved from 11.3 per cent (March 
2000) to 13.2 per cent (March 2009) (Table 17). All commercial banks, as 
noted earlier, are Basel II compliant as of April 2009. Reflecting the 
strength of the banking system, confidence in the Indian banking system 
has been maintained since the early 1990s, even in the current episode of 
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severe financial turmoil. Unlike other major advanced economies and also 
economies in the Asian region, no need was felt for enhancing deposit 
insurance or guaranteeing deposits and liabilities. Overall, financial 
stability could be maintained.  
Table 17: Key Indicators of Scheduled Commercial Banks in India 
Item 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 
1 2 3 4 5 6
Capital to Risk-weighted Assets 
Ratio (CRAR) (per cent) 
12.8 12.3 12.3 13.0 13.2
Of which: Tier I CRAR (per cent) 8.4 9.3 8.3 9.1 n.a.
Net Non-Performing Assets (per 
cent to net advances) 
1.9 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.1
Net Non-Performing Assets (per 
cent to assets) 
0.9 0.7 0.6 0.6 n.a.
Net profits (per cent to assets) 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0
Net interest margin (per cent to 
assets) 
2.8 2.8 2.6 2.3 2.4
Source: Report on Trend and Progress, 2007-08, Reserve Bank of India; Annual Report, 
2008-09. 
 
There has been an all-round improvement in the productivity/efficiency 
of the banking sector since 2001-02 (RBI, 2008). Various 
efficiency/productivity and soundness parameters have moved closer to 
the global levels. The most significant improvement has taken place in the 
performance of public sector banks, as a result of which the performance 
of various bank groups has now converged with that of foreign banks and 
new private sector banks in respect of most of the parameters. The 
intermediation cost as also the net interest margin declined across the 
bank groups. Despite this, however, the profitability of the banking sector 
improved. Thus, it is not the higher interest rate spreads but rather 
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increased efficiency that led to higher profitability. Efficiency and 
productivity based on economic measures corroborate the findings of the 
accounting measures or financial ratios. Efficiency has improved across all 
bank groups when measured from a grand frontier for all banks for the 
period 1991-92 to 2006-07 and most of these efficiency gains have 
emanated after few years of reforms, i.e., from 1997-98 onwards.  
Overall, the Indian financial sector has transformed into a reasonably 
sophisticated, diverse and resilient system delivering a wide variety of 
financial services efficiently and profitably, with a spectrum of financial 
market segments in which financial institutions are able to participate with 
operational and functional autonomy in an environment of increasing 
deregulation and international competition. The financial system has 
served well the overall needs of the economy while containing risk and 
entrenching financial stability. The process of “Schumpeterian creative 
destruction” (Mistry Committee Report, Government of India, 2007), 
although appropriate for non-financial firms, is not strictly applicable to the 
banking sector, as again forcefully shown by the global financial crisis. 
The mechanical application of “Schumpeterian creative destruction” 
principle to the banking industry can lead to systemic instability with 
severe consequences for the real economy.   
Money Supply, Credit and Inflation: Cross-Country Comparisons 
In the context of sterilisation operations, it is often argued that it leads 
to loss of control over monetary aggregates. Recent cross-country 
experience does not seem to support such a hypothesis. Countries which 
reportedly do not intervene in the foreign exchange markets - such as 
Australia, UK, US  - as well as those which have adopted an inflation 
targeting framework  - such as Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, 
Indonesia, Peru, Poland and South Africa – all witnessed acceleration in 
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growth in broad money during this decade (Table 18) 11F11. Similar trends can 
be observed in the case of credit growth (Table 19).  In fact there was an 
all round significant increase in broad money and credit growth in most 
advanced economies from around 2005, which should have served as 
early warning signals of the problems that emerged later. 
                                                            
11 Classification of countries into emerging market economies and advanced economies in Tables 
18‐21 is based on the classification adopted by the IMF in its World Economic Outlook. 
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Table 18: Broad Money: Cross-Country Comparison 
(Annual growth in per cent)
Country 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Emerging Market Economies 
Argentina 19.7 29.6 21.4 21.5 20.3 24.5 8.0
Brazil (1999) 9.9 20.5 16.6 19.2 18.6 18.4 18.0
Chile (1999) 6.1 -0.5 9.6 9.9 20.6 18.8 10.8
China,P.R.: Mainland 13.1 19.2 14.9 16.7 22.1 16.7 17.8
Colombia (1999) 4.6 10.6 19.2 17.6 18.0 17.4 18.5
Guatemala (1991) 7.5 43.0 10.9 13.8 13.4 9.8 5.9
Hungary (2001) 14.1 12.5 8.9 13.5 14.1 9.5 9.4
India 14.7 16.7 11.8 16.9 21.7 21.4 18.6
Indonesia (2005) 4.8 8.4 8.7 16.3 14.9 19.3 14.9
Latvia 19.9 22.1 26.7 38.3 38.7 13.5 -4.0
Malaysia 4.8 8.6 12.7 8.8 13.6 7.9 10.5
Mexico (2001) 5.1 9.3 13.0 10.0 6.7 10.1 8.9
Peru (2002) 5.1 -2.4 3.1 16.8 11.8 23.0 23.2
Philippines (2002) 10.4 3.6 9.9 6.4 19.6 5.4      n.a.
Poland (1998) -2.0 5.4 7.7 12.8 14.8 13.0 19.1
Romania (2005) 46.6 21.1 48.4 20.0 14.1 33.7 17.6
Russia 33.8 38.5 33.7 36.3 40.5 44.2 14.6
South Africa (2000) 7.6 13.4 13.2 20.7 22.6 23.4 15.7
Thailand (2000) 3.8 4.8 5.6 6.1 8.1 6.2 9.2
Turkey (2006) 28.6 14.4 20.8 35.8 22.2 15.2 24.9
Advanced Economies 
Australia (1993) 5.6 12.8 11.4 8.6 15.0 29.9 14.9
Canada (1991) 2.7 0.5 5.5 9.8 12.6 -25.3 15.1
China,P.R.:Hong Kong 0.5 6.3 7.3 3.5 16.2 18.8 4.2
Czech Republic (1997) -2.1 7.4 4.4 8.4 9.9 12.8 8.5
Euro area 6.8 6.9 6.6 7.5 10.0 11.4 7.4
Iceland 15.0 22.4 13.5 29.3 60.1      n.a.      n.a.
Israel (1997) 6.9 -0.1 3.6 11.2 5.1 8.0      n.a.
Korea (1998) 11.0 6.7 -0.6 3.1 4.4 0.3 15.9
Japan 0.9 0.5 0.6 0.5 -0.7 0.7 0.7
New Zealand (1989) 7.7 10.6 5.6 11.4 7.8 10.9 12.4
Switzerland 5.7 8.4 2.9 6.8 4.9 3.3 3.0
United Kingdom (1992) 5.0 9.8 9.8 13.8 14.1 15.8 17.3
United States 4.5 4.4 5.6 8.2 9.4 12.1 8.4
Source: International Financial Statistics (June 2009 CD-ROM), IMF; Reserve Bank of India; 
European Central Bank.  
Note: For inflation targeting (IT) countries, the year of adoption of IT is given in parenthesis 
(Source: Hammond (2009).  
n.a.: not available. 
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Table 19: Bank Credit: Cross-Country Comparison 
(Annual growth in per cent)
Country 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Emerging Market Economies 
Argentina -12.8 -15.5 15.4 31.7 36.1 37.0 20.1
Brazil (1999) 15.7 7.8 14.9 19.3 25.7 36.6 30.1
Chile (1999) 8.2 6.2 15.2 16.0 15.8 21.0 18.6
China,P.R.: Mainland 17.2 20.8 11.2 9.1 14.3 19.3 14.0
Colombia (1999) 6.2 8.8 29.8 11.3 38.5 23.5 15.9
Guatemala (1991) 4.6 33.3 9.2 25.0 18.0 26.3 -12.6
Hungary (2001) 19.2 33.6 18.6 18.9 16.7 18.8 18.5
India 26.9 18.4 27.5 31.8 28.5 23.0 17.8
Indonesia (2005) 16.0 19.2 31.1 21.0 12.1 22.4 30.7
Latvia 36.5 37.3 46.8 63.6 58.3 34.0 11.8
Malaysia 2.6 6.7 6.5 9.1 6.8 9.2 10.4
Mexico (2001) 19.8 7.4 7.0 17.8 30.8 18.0 1.9
Peru (2002) -0.5 -4.7 -0.3 16.5 6.3 31.3 32.8
Philippines (2002) 0.8 1.1 9.3 -2.2 7.4 4.8 n.a.
Poland (1998) 4.3 6.7 10.0 9.3 24.0 31.5 36.4
Romania (2005) 51.2 76.6 42.4 49.0 54.9 62.4 34.0
Russia 30.1 44.7 48.2 35.2 49.5 50.9 36.4
South Africa (2000) -12.4 18.1 14.6 17.0 25.4 22.0 10.0
Thailand (2000) 12.3 6.4 11.3 8.0 4.5 4.8 8.8
Turkey (2006) 38.0 30.0 46.0 49.5 36.3 26.4 24.6
Advanced Economies 
Australia (1993) 10.4 15.4 11.4 13.2 13.2 17.4 12.8
Canada (1991) 1.3 1.0 8.5 12.2 16.1 -2.9 5.5
China,P.R.:Hong Kong -4.0 -2.8 3.7 6.0 1.8 9.7 6.2
Czech Republic (1997) -20.7 7.9 12.0 20.1 19.9 28.3 14.8
Euro area 4.7 5.8 7.1 9.5 11.5 12.8 7.1
Iceland 11.2 27.7 39.6 66.1 46.8 n.a. n.a.
Israel (1997) 9.4 -3.6 4.3 11.9 3.8 8.3 7.6
Korea (1998) 19.6 8.7 1.3 7.4 14.7 12.4 14.9
Japan -7.8 -3.9 -2.3 3.8 -0.1 -0.2 1.1
New Zealand (1989) 7.2 10.0 -4.7 16.2 15.4 15.1 13.4
Switzerland 0.3 3.6 4.3 6.4 9.1 8.8 -1.0
United Kingdom (1992) 8.4 9.7 11.2 10.4 13.3 16.0 15.8
United States 3.6 7.2 10.6 10.6 9.5 9.2 2.1
Source: International Financial Statistics (June 2009 CD-ROM), IMF; Reserve Bank of India; 
European Central Bank.  
Note: For inflation targeting (IT) countries, the year of adoption of IT is given in parenthesis 
(Source: Hammond (2009).  
For India, data pertain to non-food credit by scheduled commercial banks. 
n.a.: not available. 
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Analytically, it is not clear as to why money supply and credit will not 
accelerate in countries that do not intervene. If such countries face large 
capital inflows, then in the absence of central bank intervention, such 
flows will get intermediated by the banking system. These will then get 
reflected in credit and monetary aggregates. On the contrary, sterilisation 
can help contain excessive growth in monetary aggregates. If sterilisation 
is ineffective, it could be the result of the absence of adequate instruments 
with the central bank. Of course, sterilisation should not be seen as the 
sole instrument of capital account management. Rather, it is most 
effective when it is deployed in conjunction with the use of other 
instruments, including for capital account management, a flexible 
exchange rate, financial market development and fiscal prudence. 
 
Inflation 
Active management of capital flows, effective sterilisation of foreign 
exchange market interventions and judicious use of the menu of monetary 
instruments is reflected in final objectives of inflation and growth. Inflation 
in India since the mid-1990s has been significantly lower than in the 
preceding three decades. Inflation has averaged around 5 per cent since 
mid-1990s as compared with around 8 per cent during the preceding three 
decades (Chart 13). Inflation in India over the recent years has been 
comparable to those in other emerging market economies. Inflation did 
rise, however, in 2007 and 2008 because of higher food and fuel prices as 
in many other economies (Table 20). Thus, there is no evidence that 
multiple objectives hampered pursuit of price stability.  In this context, 
India monetary policy performed about as well as inflation targeting EMEs. 
 
77 
 
 
Chart 13 
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Table 20: Consumer Price Inflation: Cross-Country Comparison 
(Per cent)
Country 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Emerging Market Economies
Argentina 25.9 13.4 4.4 9.6 10.9 8.8 8.6
Brazil (1999) 8.5 14.7 6.6 6.9 4.2 3.6 9.8
Chile (1999) 2.5 2.8 1.1 3.1 3.4 4.4 8.7
China,P.R.: Mainland -0.8 1.2 3.9 1.8 1.5 4.8 5.9
Colombia (1999) 6.4 7.1 5.9 5.0 4.3 5.5 7.0
Guatemala (1991) 6.3 5.9 9.2 8.6 5.8 8.7 6.7
Hungary (2001) 5.3 4.6 6.8 3.6 3.9 7.9 6.1
India 4.4 3.8 3.8 4.2 5.8 6.4 8.4
Indonesia (2005) 11.9 6.6 6.2 10.5 13.1 6.3 10.1
Latvia 1.9 3.0 6.2 6.7 6.5 10.1 15.4
Malaysia 1.8 1.0 1.5 3.0 3.6 2.0 5.4
Mexico (2001) 5.0 4.5 4.7 4.0 3.6 4.0 5.1
Peru (2002) 0.2 2.3 3.7 1.6 2.0 1.8 6.6
Philippines (2002) 10.0 3.5 6.0 7.6 6.2 2.8 9.3
Poland (1998) 1.9 0.8 3.6 2.1 1.1 2.4 4.3
Romania (2005) 22.5 15.3 11.9 9.0 6.6 4.8 7.8
Russia 15.8 13.7 10.9 12.7 9.7 9.0 14.1
South Africa (2000) 9.2 5.6 -0.9 2.1 3.2 6.1 9.8
Thailand (2000) 0.7 1.8 2.8 4.5 4.6 2.2 5.5
Turkey (2006) 45.0 25.3 10.6 10.1 10.5 8.8 10.4
Advanced Economies 
Australia (1993) 3.0 2.8 2.3 2.7 3.5 2.3 4.4
Canada (1991) 2.3 2.8 1.9 2.2 2.0 2.1 2.4
China,P.R.:Hong Kong -3.1 -2.5 -0.4 0.9 2.0 2.0 4.3
Czech Republic (1997) 1.8 0.1 2.8 1.8 2.5 2.9 6.4
Euro area 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.1 3.3
Iceland 5.2 2.1 2.8 4.2 6.7 5.1 12.7
Israel (1997) 5.7 0.7 -0.4 1.3 2.1 0.5 4.6
Korea (1998) 2.8 3.5 3.6 2.8 2.3 2.5 4.7
Japan -0.9 -0.2 0.0 -0.3 0.2 0.1 1.4
New Zealand (1989) 2.7 1.8 2.3 3.0 3.4 2.4 4.0
Switzerland 0.6 0.6 0.8 1.2 1.1 0.7 2.4
United Kingdom (1992) 1.6 2.9 3.0 2.8 3.2 4.3 4.0
United States 1.6 2.3 2.7 3.4 3.2 2.9 3.8
Memo:        
World 3.5 3.8 3.7 3.8 3.6 3.9 5.9
Advanced Economies 1.5 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.3 3.4
Developing Asia 2.3 2.7 4.2 3.8 4.1 5.4 7.8
Western Hemisphere 8.8 10.6 6.7 6.3 5.2 5.3 7.8
Source: International Financial Statistics (June 2009 CD). 
Note: For inflation targeting (IT) countries, the year of adoption of IT is given in parenthesis (Source: 
Hammond (2009). 
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Output Growth 
Even as inflation was contained, growth witnessed acceleration, 
especially in the current decade (Chart 14). Real GDP growth averaged 
almost 9 per cent during the four year period 2004-08. Under the impact of 
the global financial crisis, growth moderated to 6.7 per cent in 2008-09 in 
contrast to outright contraction of activity in most economies.  
Chart 14 
 
 
Amongst the major EMEs, India was the second fastest growing 
economy after China during 2002-09 (Table 21 and Chart 15) 12F12. Along 
with China, India is one of the few countries that would record positive 
growth during 2009.  
 
                                                            
12 While during 2002-07 (period taken in Chart 17) growth of Latvia was higher 
than India, the Latvian economy contracted by 5 per cent in 2008 and is 
projected to contract by another 12 per cent in 2009. Thus, during 2002-09, 
India’s growth is higher than Latvia. 
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Table 21: Real GDP Growth: Cross-Country Comparison 
(Per cent)
Country 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 P
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Emerging Market Economies
Argentina -10.9 8.8 9.0 9.2 8.5 8.7 7.0 -1.5
Brazil (1999) 2.7 1.1 5.7 3.2 4.0 5.7 5.1 -1.3
Chile (1999) 2.2 4.0 6.0 5.6 4.6 4.7 3.2 0.1
China,P.R.: Mainland 9.1 10.0 10.1 10.4 11.6 13.0 9.0 7.5
Colombia (1999) 2.5 4.6 4.7 5.7 6.9 7.5 2.5 0.0
Guatemala (1991) 3.9 2.5 3.2 3.3 5.4 6.3 4.0 1.0
Hungary (2001) 4.1 4.2 4.8 4.0 4.0 1.1 0.6 -3.3
Iceland 0.1 2.4 7.7 7.5 4.5 5.5 0.3 -10.6
India 4.6 6.9 7.9 9.2 9.8 9.3 7.3 5.4
Indonesia (2005) 4.5 4.8 5.0 5.7 5.5 6.3 6.1 2.5
Latvia 6.5 7.2 8.7 10.6 12.2 10.0 -4.6 -12.0
Malaysia 5.4 5.8 6.8 5.3 5.8 6.3 4.6 -3.5
Mexico (2001) 0.8 1.7 4.0 3.2 5.1 3.3 1.3 -7.3
Peru (2002) 5.0 4.0 5.0 6.8 7.7 8.9 9.8 3.5
Philippines (2002) 4.4 4.9 6.4 5.0 5.4 7.2 4.6 0.0
Poland (1998) 1.4 3.9 5.3 3.6 6.2 6.7 4.8 -0.7
Romania (2005) 5.0 5.3 8.5 4.1 7.9 6.2 7.1 -4.1
Russia 4.7 7.3 7.2 6.4 7.7 8.1 5.6 -6.5
South Africa (2000) 3.7 3.1 4.9 5.0 5.3 5.1 3.1 -0.3
Thailand (2000) 5.3 7.1 6.3 4.6 5.2 4.9 2.6 -3.0
Turkey (2006) 6.2 5.3 9.4 8.4 6.9 4.7 1.1 -5.1
Advanced Economies 
Australia (1993) 4.3 3.0 3.8 2.8 2.8 4.0 2.1 -1.4
Canada (1991) 2.9 1.9 3.1 2.9 3.1 2.7 0.5 -2.3
China,P.R.:Hong Kong 1.8 3.0 8.5 7.1 7.0 6.4 2.5 -4.5
Czech Republic (1997) 1.9 3.6 4.5 6.3 6.8 6.0 3.2 -3.5
Euro area 0.9 0.8 2.2 1.7 2.9 2.7 0.9 -4.8
Israel (1997) -0.6 1.8 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.4 3.9 -1.7
Korea (1998) 7.2 2.8 4.6 4.0 5.2 5.1 2.2 -4.0
Japan 0.3 1.4 2.7 1.9 2.0 2.4 -0.6 -6.0
New Zealand (1989) 4.9 4.1 4.5 2.8 1.9 3.2 0.3 -2.0
Switzerland 0.4 -0.2 2.5 2.5 3.4 3.3 1.6 -3.0
United Kingdom (1992) 2.1 2.8 2.8 2.1 2.8 3.0 0.7 -4.2
United States 1.6 2.5 3.6 2.9 2.8 2.0 1.1 -2.6
Source: World Economic Outlook (WEO) Database (April 2009) and WEO Update (July 2009), IMF. 
Note:  
1. Data for 2009 are IMF projections.  
2. For inflation targeting (IT) countries, the year of adoption of IT is given in parenthesis (Source: 
Hammond (2009).  
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Chart 15         
 
 
Thus, Indian growth since the early 1990s has been quite creditable. It 
has been achieved in an environment of financial stability. Despite this 
record of high growth, low inflation, rapid credit expansion, substantial 
external opening and financial deepening while maintaining financial 
stability, an influential body of opinion has forcefully argued for a faster 
pace of liberalisation in both the domestic financial and external sectors. It 
is important to recognise that a banking crisis has output losses not only in 
the short-run, but these losses are persistent and, in many cases, such 
losses are not recouped even in the medium-to-long term. Thus, even if 
the growth rate returns to its pre-crisis rate – which is not necessarily the 
case - the level of output may remain well below its pre-crisis level. IMF 
(2009c) has attempted to quantify the impact of banking crises on output 
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in the medium term. The key findings of the IMF study 13F13 are: first, following 
a banking crisis, the path of output tends to be depressed substantially 
and persistently, with no rebound on average to the pre-crisis trend over 
the medium-term. Second, on average, in the sample events, output is 
found to fall steadily below its pre-crisis trend until the third year after the 
crisis. Third, seven years after the crisis, output in these episodes was 10 
per cent below the trend on average. The output losses in specific cases 
can be very high – for instance, per capita output in Thailand seven years 
after the East Asian crisis is estimated to be only 44 per cent of the level 
had it continued to grow at its pre-crisis trend (Annex 6). Finally, the 
depressed output path tends to result from long-lasting reductions of 
roughly equal proportion in the employment rate, the capital-to-labour 
ratio, and total factor productivity. If so, the potential output growth rate of 
the economy also suffers. Against this backdrop, Indian growth 
acceleration, while ensuring financial stability, stands out and is reflective 
of the adroit macroeconomic and monetary management and a cautious 
approach to financial globalisation.  
 
 
Monetary Policy Independence 
It is usually argued that if a central bank attempts to manage the 
impossible trinity, monetary policy may not be independent. What has 
been the Indian experience in this regard?  In a globalised economy, 
business cycles are getting increasingly synchronised. To that extent, 
monetary policy actions also seem to be synchronised. However, while 
India’s external openness has increased significantly since the early 
                                                            
13 The IMF study is based on financial crisis events from the early 1970s to 2002. The sample 
includes 88 banking crises and 222 currency crises, distributed across high‐, middle‐, and low‐
income economies. 
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1990s, domestic demand remains the key driver of economic activity. 
Thus, the size of output gaps need not be same across countries. 
Accordingly, inflation dynamics also differ across countries. These 
developments came to the forefront during the second half of 2007-08 and 
the first half of 2008-09. Following the sub-prime crisis, monetary policy in 
the US was loosened from August 2007 onwards. In India, at the same 
time, aggregate demand was seen as running ahead of supply; inflation 
pressures were rising on the back of demand as well as supply shocks. In 
contrast to the trends in the US, monetary policy continued to be in 
tightening mode in India (Chart 16).  
Chart 16 
 
Following the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, there 
was, however, sudden and severe weakening of the global economy. 
External demand witnessed a large collapse. There was also a substantial 
reversal in portfolio capital inflows and trade financing dried. Monetary 
policy, therefore, quickly reversed gear in the second half of 2008-09 and 
shifted into an accommodative mode. Liquidity was injected through cuts 
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in cash reserve ratio and buyback/redemption of MSS securities as well as 
through some ad hoc measures. Thus, monetary policy actions have been 
largely driven by domestic macroeconomic and monetary conditions.  
To summarise, “impossible trinity’ was managed successfully in India 
despite massive capital inflows and volatility in such capital flows. Growth 
in monetary and credit aggregates was broadly in line with demands of the 
real economy. Inflation exhibited significant reduction from its levels 
prevailing during 1970s to mid-1990s, while real GDP growth recorded 
noticeable acceleration. These positive outcomes were made possible by 
using a variety of tools – policy preference for non-debt flows, active 
management of debt flows in the capital account, interventions in the 
foreign exchange market, sterilisation through multiple instruments, 
adequate reserves, continuous development of financial markets and the 
financial sector and use of prudential instruments. Such an integrated 
approach was, in turn, possible due to monetary policy which eschewed 
the narrow price stability/inflation targeting framework. Monetary policy 
was conducted with a view to ensuring not only price stability but also 
financial stability. In this endeavour, the fact that regulation of banks and 
key financial markets remains with the Reserve Bank permitted the 
Reserve Bank to use prudential instruments in addition to monetary 
instruments. More generally, policymakers also recognised that while 
financial markets, both domestic and global, provide useful signals, this is 
not always so. Financial markets are prone to herding and bubbles, which 
require pre-emptive policy measures to ensure price and financial stability.  
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V.  CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
There is now a growing consensus that a fully open capital account 
does not lead to higher growth. Rather, it increases vulnerabilities to 
financial crisis. As the current global financial crisis has shown, this is as 
true for EMEs as for advanced economies. Accordingly, capital account 
opening needs to be well-sequenced contingent upon developments in 
both the real sector and financial sector, and in fiscal policy. Greater 
caution is needed in liberalisation of debt flows. Among various resident 
entities, a more prudent regime for external borrowings is necessary for 
the banking sector and other financial intermediaries. Non-resident 
investments in risk-free sovereign debt instruments also need to be 
restricted since interest rate differentials favour EMEs and these 
differentials can encourage hot money.  
In recent years, many EMEs have received capital flows much larger 
than their financing requirements. When capital flows are significantly in 
excess of a sustainable level of current account deficit, and the exchange 
rate is flexible, it is obvious that they cannot be absorbed domestically, 
howsoever efficient the financial system may be. Real exchange rate 
misalignment, current account imbalances, excesses in credit markets, 
asset price booms, overheating and inflation are the most likely outcomes. 
It would be question of time before financial fragility leads to crisis. Thus, 
surging capital flows should not be perceived as a sign of strength, but as 
a potential source of disequilibrium (UNCTAD, 2009). Capital flows, 
therefore, need to be managed actively. Capital controls can be effective, 
even though they may not be foolproof, and are in fact subject to leakage 
in the context of the current global financial market environment. Capital 
controls have to be a part of an overall package comprising exchange rate 
flexibility, the maintenance of adequate reserves, sterilisation and 
development of the financial sector. There is clearly need for the 
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deployment of multiple instruments. The current fashion of single 
objective, single instrument monetary policy is undoubtedly inadequate to 
deal with capital flows.  
Against this backdrop, the Indian experience holds important lessons. 
Monetary policy in India has faced growing challenges from large and 
volatile capital flows since 1993-94, especially during 2007-09. In 
response to these capital flows, a multi-pronged approach was adopted. 
Key elements of this framework have been: active management of the 
capital account, especially debt flows; tighter prudential restrictions on 
access of financial intermediaries to external borrowings; flexibility in 
exchange rate movements but with capacity to intervene in times of 
excessive volatility; treating capital flows as largely volatile unless proven 
otherwise; building up of adequate reserves; sterilisation of interventions 
in the foreign exchange market through multiple instruments, including 
cash reserve requirements; continuous development of financial markets 
in terms of participants and instruments, but with a cautious approach to 
risky instruments; strengthening of the financial sector through prudential 
regulation while also enhancing competition; pre-emptive tightening of 
prudential norms; and refinements in institutional framework for monetary 
policy. Policies operate symmetrically. During periods of heavy inflows, 
liquidity is absorbed through increases in the cash reserve ratio and 
issuances under the market stabilisation scheme. During periods of 
reversal, liquidity is injected through cuts in cash reserve ratio and 
unwinding of the market stabilisation scheme. Overall, rather than relying 
on a single instrument, many instruments have been used in coordination. 
This was enabled by the fact that both monetary policy and regulation of 
banks and other financial institutions and key financial markets are under 
the jurisdiction of the Reserve Bank, which permitted smooth use of 
various policy instruments. Unlike many EMEs, India has been running 
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trade and current account deficits. While the current account deficit is 
modest and manageable, the trade deficit is high. Management of the 
capital account and exchange rate is also important from this perspective. 
The outcomes have been satisfactory. Growth in monetary and credit 
aggregates was, by and large, contained within desired trajectories and 
consistent with the overall GDP growth objective. There has been 
significant financial deepening. Inflation has been reduced significantly 
from its levels prevailing during the forty year period until the late 1990s. 
Growth has witnessed significant acceleration on the back of productivity 
gains, which are also reflected in the growth of exports of goods and 
services. Domestic investment has increased substantially since the 
beginning of this decade and this is predominantly financed by domestic 
savings. The surge in investment and savings was made possible by 
efficient allocation of resources by the domestic banking system and 
financial markets, despite many constraints. Overall, financial stability has 
been maintained.  
Capital flows volatility poses large challenges but these can be 
managed. Key lessons from the Indian experience are that monetary 
policy needs to move away from narrow price stability/inflation targeting 
objective. Central banks need to be concerned not only with monetary 
policy but also with development and regulation of banks and key financial 
markets –money, credit, bond and currency markets. Depending on the 
institutional legacy within different countries, if these additional functions 
are not vested within the central bank, adequate coordination mechanisms 
need to be put in place to enable the central bank to interact with the other 
agencies and act on needed prudential measures. Given the volatility and 
the need to ensure broader stability of the financial system, central banks 
need multiple instruments. Capital account management has to be 
countercyclical, just as is the case monetary and fiscal policies. 
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Judgements in capital account management are no more complex than 
those made in monetary management.   
Looking ahead, as the Indian economy recovers from the drag 
imposed by the global financial crisis and returns to its pre-crisis growth 
trajectory of 9 per cent or above, the current cautious approach towards 
capital account liberalisation, continuous development of financial markets 
and further strengthening of the financial sector will need to continue. 
However, the return to the high growth path would also be contingent 
upon progress in a number of other areas: strengthening of agriculture, 
improvement in physical, social and urban infrastructure; and reversing 
the deterioration in public finances.   
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Annex 1 
Exchange Rates and Current Account Balance:  
Cross-Country Analysis 
 
According to Taylor (2008), in the state of the art monetary models, an 
increase in the trade deficit will tend to lead to a depreciation of the 
currency. Is this assumption supported by data?  
In order to examine this assumption, an analysis of current account 
balance and exchange rate (both nominal and real) is attempted for the 
recent period 2002 to 2007 (i.e., for the period prior the crisis). The 
analysis is attempted for a sample of 36 countries (including the euro 
area) 14F14. The variables are defined as follows. Current account balance is 
taken as per cent to GDP, averaged for the period 2002-2007. As regards 
exchange rate, variation between December 2001 and December 2007 is 
considered for nominal effective exchange rate and real effective 
exchange rate.  
The analysis shows a negative relationship, i.e., current account 
deficits are associated with not only real appreciation but even nominal 
appreciation (Annex Chart 1). As many as 14 out of 36 sample countries 
had current account deficits but still experienced real appreciation; another 
9 countries recorded real depreciation despite current account surpluses. 
In regressions of variations in nominal and real effective exchange rates 
on current account balance (per cent to GDP), the coefficients are 
significant (Annex Table 1).Thus, at least in the current decade, countries 
with large current account deficits have surprisingly experienced a 
                                                            
14 The countries included are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Taiwan, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Euro area, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, 
Israel, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Switzerland, 
Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States.  
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tendency for their exchange rates to appreciate, which can have 
significant deleterious effects on their real economies.  
 
Annex Chart 1: Current Account Balance and Exchange Rate 
 
 
Note: See notes to Annex Table 1 for variable definitions, country coverage and 
sources. 
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Annex Table 1: Current Account Balance and Exchange Rate:  
Cross-Country Results 
 
NEER =   1.7  –  1.04 CAB          R-bar^2 = 0.06 
                (0.5)    (1.8) 
 
REER =   10.4  –  1.57 CAB          R-bar^2 = 0.12 
                (2.5)    (2.4) 
Note: 
Figures in parentheses are t-statistics.  
NEER = variation in nominal effective exchange rate between December 2007 
and December 2001 
REER = variation in real effective exchange rate between December 2007 and 
December 2001  
CAB = Current account balance (per cent to GDP) (average for 2002-2007) 
NEER and REER data are from Bank for International Settlements and CAB from 
World Economic Outlook Database (April 2009), IMF. 
The analysis is conducted for 36 countries. See footnote 14 for the list of 
countries. 
 
96 
 
Annex 2  
Determinants of Non-Resident Deposit Inflows 
 
Following the extant literature (for instance, Gordon and Gupta, 
2004), inflows under NRI deposits schemes are postulated to depend 
upon relative interest rates on these deposit schemes 15F15, exchange rate of 
the rupee, and economic conditions in the source countries (which are 
proxied by world exports). Since the factors impacting the rupee and 
foreign currency denominated deposits can be different, inflows under the 
two deposits schemes – NRERA and FCNRB – are modelled separately. 
Exchange rate movements can be expected to be amongst the 
determinants of rupee denominated deposits (NRERA) where the 
exchange rate risk is borne by the depositor. As regards foreign currency 
denominated deposits (FCNRB), depositors do not bear any exchange 
rate risk and the exchange rate, a priori, need not be a determinant of 
such deposits. Dummy is included to capture flows into these deposits 
from the bullet redemption of India Millennium Deposits (IMDs) in 
December 2005. Another dummy is included to capture the impact of the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers.  
The estimated equations for NRERA and FCNRB deposits are set 
out in Annex Table 2. All the variables are significant and have the 
expected signs.  
Estimates suggest that, over the sample period, an increase of 100 
basis points in interest rates on NRERA deposits is associated with an 
increase of US $ 114 million in inflows under these deposits with a lag of 
one month; the long-run impact is higher at US $ 146 million. For FCNRB 
deposits, the corresponding short- and long-run impact is estimated at US 
                                                            
15 Since interest rate ceilings on spreads are specified with respect to LIBOR/swap rates, 
these spreads can be interpreted as relative interest rates (relative to interest rates in 
foreign countries).  
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$ 213 million and US $ 270 million, respectively. The combined impact of 
an increase of 100 basis points in interest rate ceilings on both the 
schemes is, therefore, estimated to be an increase of around US $ 350 
million per month in these deposits in the short-run and around US $ 415 
million in the long-run. The annual impact is, therefore, estimated to be US 
$ 4.2-5.0 billion.  
Amongst other determinants, an increase of US $ 1 billion in world 
exports (a proxy for economic conditions in the source countries and, in 
turn, that of income of non-residents) leads to an increase of US $ 142 
million and US $ 87 million, respectively, per month in inflows under 
NRERA and FCNRB deposits in the short-run. The long-run impact is 
around US $ 182 billion and US $ 110 billion, respectively.  
Exchange rate movements are not found to have impact on FCNRB 
deposits, as expected. However, in the case of NRERA deposits, a 
depreciation of Rs. 1 (per US dollar) is followed by an outflow of around 
US $ 50 million.  
Redemption of IMDs had a positive one-time impact on FCNRB 
deposits, since both the deposits are in foreign currency. However, IMD 
redemption did not have any impact on the rupee deposits.  
Finally, the collapse of Lehman Brothers had a huge negative 
impact on FCNRB inflows, but surprisingly, a positive impact on NRERA 
deposits. The negative impact on FCNRB deposits is almost offset by 
higher inflows under NRERA deposits. 
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Annex Table 2: Determinants of Non-Resident Deposit Inflows 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Non-Resident External 
Rupee Accounts 
(NRERA) 
 Foreign Currency Non-
Resident Bank (FCNRB) 
Deposits
 
Sample Period:  
August 2003—February 
2009 
 Sample Period:  
May 2001—February 2009 
 
Dependent Variable: 
NRERA 
 Dependent Variable: 
FCNRB 
 
 Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic  
Constant -0.8 0.0 81.1 4.6  
NREINT{1} 1.15 2.2   
FCNRINT{1}  2.13 4.2  
DWEXP 1.42 3.0 0.87 3.2  
NRERA{4} 0.22 2.3   
FCNRB{2}  0.21 4.0  
DINR{3} -51.1 1.7   
DUMIMD  759.5 37.8  
DUMLEH 662.9 15.3 -710.6 22.6  
    
R-bar 2 0.30 0.52   
Durbin’s h 1.56 0.71   
       
Note:  
Equations have been estimated using monthly data. Variables are as following: 
NRERA = monthly inflows/outflows (net) under Non-Resident External Rupee Accounts 
scheme (measured in US $ million) 
FCNRB= monthly inflows/outflows (net) under Foreign Currency Non-Resident Bank 
(FCNRB) Deposits scheme (measured in US $ million) 
NREINT = interest rate ceiling spread (basis points) over LIBOR for deposits under Non-
Resident External Rupee Accounts scheme 
FCNRINT = interest rate ceiling spread (basis points) over LIBOR for deposits under 
Foreign Currency Non-Resident Bank (FCNRB) Deposits scheme 
DINR = month-on-month variation in exchange rate of Rupee vis-a-vis US dollar. 
DWEXP = month-on-month variation in world exports (measured in US $ billion) (Source: 
IFS, IMF) 
DUMIMD = dummy for redemption of India Millennium Deposits (IMDs) deposits in 
December 2005 (December 2005=1; 0 otherwise) 
DUMLEH = dummy for Lehman Brothers failure (October 2008=1; 0 otherwise) 
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Annex 3
Chinn-Ito Indices of Financial Openness 
           
Year India Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand Argentina Brazil US UK 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1970 -1.13 0.45 -1.13 -0.09 -0.32 -0.09 0.72 -1.81 2.53 -1.81
1971 -1.13 0.72 -1.13 -0.09 -0.59 -0.09 -1.00 -1.81 2.53 -0.77
1972 -1.13 0.99 -1.13 -0.09 -0.86 -0.09 -1.27 -1.81 2.53 -0.77
1973 -1.13 1.26 -1.13 0.18 -1.13 -0.09 -1.54 -1.81 2.53 -0.77
1974 -1.13 1.26 -1.13 0.45 -1.13 -0.09 -1.81 -1.81 2.53 -0.77
1975 -1.13 1.26 -1.13 0.72 -1.13 -0.09 -1.81 -1.81 2.53 -0.77
1976 -1.13 1.26 -1.13 0.99 -1.13 -0.09 -1.81 -1.81 2.53 -0.77
1977 -1.13 0.22 -1.13 1.26 -1.13 -0.09 -0.09 -1.81 2.53 -0.77
1978 -1.13 1.26 -0.09 1.26 -1.13 -0.09 -0.09 -1.81 2.53 -0.77
1979 -1.13 1.26 -0.09 1.26 -1.13 -0.09 -0.09 -1.81 2.53 1.45
1980 -1.13 1.26 -0.09 1.26 -1.13 -0.09 -0.09 -1.81 2.53 1.72
1981 -1.13 1.26 -0.09 1.26 -1.13 -0.09 -0.09 -1.81 2.53 1.99
1982 -1.13 2.53 -1.13 2.53 -1.13 -0.09 -1.13 -1.81 2.53 2.26
1983 -1.13 2.53 -1.13 2.53 -1.13 -0.09 -1.13 -1.81 2.53 2.53
1984 -1.13 2.53 -1.13 2.53 -1.13 -0.09 -1.13 -1.81 2.53 2.53
1985 -1.13 2.53 -1.13 2.53 -0.09 -0.09 -1.13 -1.81 2.53 2.53
1986 -1.13 2.53 -1.13 2.53 -1.13 -0.09 -1.13 -1.81 2.53 2.53
1987 -1.13 2.53 -1.13 2.53 -1.13 -0.09 -1.13 -1.81 2.53 2.53
1988 -1.13 2.53 -0.09 2.53 -1.13 -0.09 -1.13 -1.81 2.53 2.53
1989 -1.13 2.53 -0.09 2.53 -1.13 -0.09 -1.13 -1.81 2.53 2.53
1990 -1.13 2.53 -0.09 2.53 -1.13 -0.09 -1.13 -1.81 2.53 2.53
1991 -1.13 2.53 -0.09 2.53 -1.13 -0.09 -1.13 -1.81 2.53 2.53
1992 -1.13 2.53 -0.09 2.53 0.14 -0.09 -1.13 -1.81 2.53 2.53
1993 -1.13 2.53 -0.09 1.26 0.14 -0.09 1.45 -1.81 2.53 2.53
1994 -1.13 2.53 -0.09 1.26 0.14 -0.09 1.72 -1.81 2.53 2.53
1995 -1.13 2.53 -0.09 1.26 1.18 -0.09 1.99 -1.81 2.53 2.53
1996 -1.13 2.26 -1.13 0.99 0.14 -0.09 1.22 -1.81 2.53 2.53
1997 -1.13 1.99 -1.13 0.72 0.14 -0.09 2.53 -1.81 2.53 2.53
1998 -1.13 1.04 -1.13 0.45 0.14 -0.09 2.26 -1.13 2.53 2.53
1999 -1.13 1.45 -1.13 0.18 0.14 -0.09 1.99 -1.13 2.53 2.53
2000 -0.09 1.18 -1.13 -0.09 0.14 -0.09 1.72 -1.13 2.53 2.53
2001 -1.13 1.18 -0.09 -0.09 0.14 -0.09 -0.86 -1.13 2.53 2.53
2002 -1.13 1.18 -0.09 -0.09 0.14 -0.09 -1.13 0.18 2.53 2.53
2003 -1.13 1.18 -0.09 -0.09 0.14 -0.09 -0.09 0.45 2.53 2.53
2004 -1.13 1.18 -0.09 -0.09 0.14 -0.09 -0.09 0.72 2.53 2.53
2005 -1.13 1.18 -0.09 -0.09 0.14 -0.09 -0.09 0.99 2.53 2.53
2006 -1.13 1.18 -0.09 -0.09 0.14 -0.09 -0.77 1.26 2.53 2.53
2007 -1.13 1.18 0.18 -0.09 0.14 -1.13 -0.77 0.99 2.53 2.53
Source: Hiro Ito's website http:/web.pdx.edu/~ito       
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Annex 4
Capital Flows (net): Country-wise 
(US $ billion)
Country 1990-96 1997-2002 2003-06 2007 2008
1 2 3 4 5 6
United States 87 318 639 664 510
Spain 11 6 56 139 142
India 7 10 25 98 40
Russia -19 -10 0 96 -136
Brazil 11 16 6 88 28
China,P.R.: Mainland 21 15 56 70 16
United Kingdom 11 26 53 66 28
Turkey 3 1 28 49 34
Euro Area n.a. n.a. 12 43 446
Poland -1 9 11 40 42
Greece 5 6 14 38 44
Italy 8 -5 21 38 82
Romania 1 2 12 29 26
France -3 -32 24 27 143
Australia 13 16 43 21 45
Mexico 16 23 11 21 25
South Africa 1 2 8 21 13
Bulgaria 0 1 5 19 17
Vietnam 3 1 3 18 n.a.
Colombia 2 2 2 10 9
Hungary 2 4 11 10 19
Peru 2 2 1 9 8
Korea 10 3 13 9 -51
Argentina 7 4 -5 4 -13
Philippines 5 3 0 4 -5
Indonesia 7 -5 0 3 -2
Israel 1 3 -8 -2 10
Thailand 13 -8 4 -2 13
Chile 3 2 -1 -9 12
Malaysia 6 -3 -5 -11 n.a.
Canada 8 -6 -24 -18 -11
Singapore -2 -11 -13 -18 n.a.
China,P.R.:Hong Kong n.a. -6 -21 -20 4
Venezuela, Rep. Bol. -1 -2 -13 -23 -26
Netherlands -9 -9 -42 -29 -34
Switzerland -16 -30 -61 -30 -45
Norway -1 -10 -30 -31 -88
Kuwait 7 -7 -28 -38 -59
Saudi Arabia 11 -3 -66 -89 n.a.
Japan -68 -77 -33 -187 -173
Germany 15 -6 -153 -325 -299
Note: Countries have been arranged in descending order on the basis of net capital flows 
received during 2007. Data in columns 2 to 4 are annual averages for the respective periods. 
Source: International Financial Statistics Online, IMF (Downloaded September 16, 2009). 
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Annex 5 
Supervisory Responsibilities: Cross-Country Practices 
According to an IMF survey which covered 140 supervisory agencies 
in 103 countries, the majority of the participants (85 agencies or 60 per 
cent of total) are unitary agencies (i.e., agencies dedicated solely to the 
supervision of a single segment of the financial sector, not combined with 
any other agency and not responsible for supervising multiple types of 
financial entities) (Seelig and Novoa, 2009). The second largest group is 
represented by ‘integrated supervisors’ with a share of 23 per cent. 
(Integrated supervisors supervise combinations of any two-types of 
financial intermediaries, i.e., banks and insurance companies, banks and 
security firms, and insurance and security firms). Only 13 percent of the 
participants are single, fully consolidated supervisors (e.g., FSA in the 
UK), who oversee the entire financial sector (banks, insurance and 
security firms. In this context, a recent IMF survey finds that central banks 
dominate other agencies in terms of responsibility for banking supervision. 
Other supervisors (insurance and securities) typically tend to be stand-
alone agencies. Out of 18 cases of consolidated supervision, four are with 
the central bank (Annex Table 3) 
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Annex Table 3: Location of Supervisory Agencies: Cross-Country Survey 
(Number of Agencies)
Nature of 
Supervisory 
Responsibility  
Supervisory Agency Located in 
Department 
in Central 
Bank
Department 
in Ministry 
of Finance 
Separate 
Agency
Others Total
1 2 3 4 5 6
Only Banking 
Supervision 
25 2 10 7 44
Only Insurance 
Supervision 
2 3 9 2 16
Only Securities 
Supervision 
1 1 23 0 25
Consolidated 
Supervision 
4 0 13 1 18
Integrated 
Supervision 
10 3 17 2 32
Others 5 5
Total 42 9 72 17 140
Source: Seelig and Novoa (2009). 
 
 
103 
 
Annex 6 
Financial Crisis and Impact on Growth 
 
Financial crises have not only a short-term but also persistent and 
long-lasting adverse impact on output levels. In this context, the 
experience of the East Asian economies following the financial crisis is 
illustrative of such losses. In all these economies, the level of real output 
today is significantly lower than the case had there been no crisis. In 
Korea and Thailand, the levels of per capita real output in 2004 (seven 
years after the crisis) were 22 per cent and 56 per cent, respectively, 
below the levels had these economies continued to grow at the rate they 
had been growing in the decade prior to the crisis (Annex Chart 2) (IMF, 
2009c).  
In the case of all the East Asian economies, investment rates as 
well real growth rates remain substantially below their pre-crisis levels. For 
instance, real GDP growth in Korea and Thailand during 2003-07 
averaged 4.3 per cent and 5.6 per cent, respectively, as compared with 
averages of 7.9 per cent and 8.6 per cent during the pre-crisis period 
(1990-96). Investment rates in these two economies fell from 38.9 per cent 
(of GDP) and 41.8 per cent in 1996, just before the crisis, 29.4 per cent 
and 26.8 per cent in 2007. Thus, significant declines in investment and 
growth rates can be a consequence of a financial crisis, which accumulate 
to large losses in output levels.  
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Annex Chart 2: Impact of East Asian Crisis on Growth 
 
 
Source: IMF (2009c). 
 
